Aviation Weekly published an article by Henry Sokolski, an old Cold War minister who had been deeply involved in the US-Soviet negotiations in the last century. He believed that the military significance of restarting China Guidance was limited. Today, with the limited funds of the U.S. Army, the arms competition brought by withdrawing China Guidance was unwilling to be seen by all parties. And today, unlike the Cold War, potential allies of the United States are reluctant to deploy medium-range missiles against China and Russia.
Nevertheless, he believes that although the United States today faces ballistic missile pressure in two directions, it strives for unity through struggle, exerts pressure on China and Russia through the development of missile technology, and then forces all parties back to the negotiating table, just as the Americans did in the cold war.
Henry Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of The Underestimated Danger: Our Less Peaceful Nuclear Future. From 1989 to 1993, he served as Deputy Secretary of the United States Defense Office. His article reads as follows:
Information map: Henry Sokolski, source: Defense News
Struggle with China?
After Donald Trump announced his withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), he received criticism from some authorities in Germany, Russia and the United States. This decision has great impact on the military, finance, alliance and diplomacy. These are far more important and important than the current media discussions.
First of all, we will discuss military issues. The United States can develop 500-5500 kilometers of missiles and deploy hundreds of land-based surface cruise missiles against China without the limitations of the INF Treaty. Of course, The Pentagon is thinking more. In October, the U.S. Army announced that it was developing artillery-fired rocket-assisted shells, some of which could have ranges of more than 1,000 miles.
The B-2 bomber at the Pearl Harbor-Hickham Joint Base (JBPH-H), the US military is pursuing a war plan far away: the US Air Force
However, the military significance of the guide is not too great. The U.S. military does use precision-guided conventional missiles to attack the military needs of Chinas command nodes, air defense radar and missile launchers, and land-based mobile medium-range missile launchers are really difficult to detect and destroy. But the question is: if the U.S. is going to hit these nodal targets, why not deploy weapons beyond the range of Chinese missiles? The United States can develop conventional missiles that range in the intercontinental range, so military significance is possible. Moreover, the competition with Chinese missiles may be out of control, which will lead the United States to consider developing weapons that exceed the current mid-range missiles.
However, under the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NEWSTART 2021) or other forms of arms control treaty, the United States may face the problem of not being able to develop similar weapons.
The second problem is the cost. Although Trump said that the United States has enough capital to manufacture the missiles it wants to build. But the fact is that the Pentagon must now fund the modernization of nuclear strategic forces, command and control systems, space satellite systems and cyber defense. Congress must also restructure the conventional air and ground forces to deal with big power competition (rather than counter-terrorism), and the Navy must expand its fleet together.
Trumps announcement in the Cabinet last month of a $20 billion cut in military spending plunged the Pentagons budget into a panic: CNN
The difficult military expenditure means that we must give up some projects in these projects. I note that the delay in the release of the Pentagons Missile Defense Assessment Report means that there is a possibility that we will reduce the cost of expensive deployable ballistic missile defense systems. Of course, these expensive missile defense systems are what our allies, Japan and South Korea, want.
South Koreas Sade system source: Social Media
Unite our allies?
This leads to the third question: where is the base for new US land-based missiles?
The most logical place would be the United States base and territory in the Western Pacific: Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Outside the territory is the US military base in Japan, which may help postpone Japans decision to develop long-range or medium-range land-based conventional missiles.
South Korea may follow suit, but is the United States willing to help South Korea extend the range of its long-range missiles? Does the United States need to allow South Korea to have an independent deterrent to Seoul, or even to deter China?
South Korea launches test source of domestic ballistic missile: Yonhap
Besides, Philippines, Vietnam, India and Australia. Politically, none of them is currently conditional for deployment guidance, but this may change over time.
In Europe, the British who support Trump and withdraw from the EU may agree to deploy middlemen on their own territory, and the eager Poles may agree. It is not clear, however, how much turmoil and opposition it may cause within the NATO to try such a deployment.
Japanese Self-Defense Force Type 90 Tank Japan maintains a relatively low military input map outside the Maritime Self-Defense Force: Social Media
Strive for unity through struggle
But the good news is that at least China and the economically bankrupt Russia are under as much pressure as the United States in the face of potential missile competition, even though China has previously made as many missiles as possible. With the passage of time, every country participating in missile competition will feel more and more pressure, because increasing missile competition will increase the related costs and risks.
Perhaps this may explain Trumps comment.
We will develop these missiles, unless China and Russia come to us, they will come to us and say, let none of us develop these weapons. I will be very happy.
Although it is not wise to expect Russia and China to grab it with their hands closed, we must prepare for it. This means that we now have to prepare for the next stage of intermediate competition: first, we compete with China and Russia for missiles, and then try to introduce competition to the diplomatic level, through diplomatic restrictions or elimination of competition.
We did it 31 years ago. The problem at that time was the nuclear threat in Europe and the first strike by the Soviet Union and the United States for medium range nuclear missiles. Now, we need to face both European and Asian middlemen, and we are now faced with precise, conventional ground-launched missiles. The challenges it brings are greater, but they are no more special than they used to be.
Source: observer net responsibility editor: Li Cong _B11284