Editors note: In April 20th, Alibaba group announced that it acquired wholly owned chip company Zhongtian micro and invested in six chip companies. Yesterday, Jingdong CEO Liu Qiangdong said in an interview with CCTV that ZTE has slapped the whole Chinese Internet entrepreneurs and all the entrepreneurs in the IT industry a slap. For a while, the voice of catching up with the whole country and catching up with the chip industry in the United States is clampant. It is very good to be determined to follow up, but the competition of the semiconductor industry is very fierce, the entrance threshold is very high. To have the core of China, Im afraid it cant be a good idea. We need to sum up the experience and lessons of the core in the past. Author Zhou Zhou (Professor of science and technology, Peking University) To be edited Every year, Peking University has a large number of outstanding computer hardware graduates transferred to the financial and Internet industries, and even went abroad to do hardware research and development. Every time I read this, I feel sad, but I also understand the choices of my classmates. Although our countrys computer hardware technology, especially the chip processing technology, still has a big gap with the worlds highest level, it needs to catch up quickly, but many students will feel no door to the country after graduation, because there are not many relevant jobs available in Beijing. Moreover, under the unbalanced and inadequate development of the whole country, there are not many employment cities for high-end talents. However, most of the limited hardware research and development units in Beijing are not enough to make a good young scientific research talented person have a basic and decent life, which makes a large number of young talents have to give up professional choice. One of the students once said before graduating: if there was a Beijing enterprise that could allow him to live in a room and let him have no trouble with his childrens education, he was absolutely desperate to make a chip for the country. At the moment of unprecedented fierce trade war between China and the United States, these words can not help but sigh. In fact, until the beginning of this century, Beijing still had a large number of independent core enterprises. So what made these independent core enterprises fall down? Here, I want to tell the story of Shougang. Dabble in core As industrial raw materials, semiconductor materials and steel have many similarities in the process of preparation. In the case of silicon wafer production, the coarse silicon is first extracted from the silicon ore, then the coarse silicon is needed to be refined into polysilicon, and then the polysilicon is also processed into monocrystalline silicon. Finally, the monocrystalline silicon is cut into silicon wafer. As for the processing of silicon wafers into semiconductor integrated circuits, that is, the commonly said chips, of course, there is a big difference from steel production, and it usually requires high-end technology and a large amount of money. However, the production and investment scale of silicon wafer is much smaller than that of chips, and the technical difficulty is not high. Therefore, many iron and steel enterprises both at home and abroad have made the decision to join the production and ranks of semiconductor materials, and cultivate the semiconductor industry as one of the pillars of the enterprises. Shougang and NEC joint venture capital iron and Steel Co., Ltd. was formally established in December 1991, with a total registered capital of 8 billion 675 million yen, of which the capital contribution ratio of Shougang accounted for 60%, and NEC accounted for 40%. The newly established Shougang is ambitious. It plans to fully introduce chip design, production and management technology from NEC company and purchase a complete set of production equipment and CAD, CAT and CAM system to realize the development, design, production, sales and service. In April 1994, Shougang first built the post production line of chip production and put it into operation, mainly engaged in 4M dynamic RAM and other chip packaging. Since the beginning of the construction, the 5 technologies, such as SOJ, SSIP, SOP, QFP and QIP, are used to represent the highest level of domestic chip production at that time. So Shougang (Shougang) has become the chip production enterprise with the highest level of domestic technology and the most form of sealing bottom. A year later, in December 1994, Shougang also completed the production line of chip production and put it into operation. The production line uses the original equipment and technical technology of NEC. According to the drawings provided by Japan, the production line mainly produces the most advanced 6 inch chip with the minimum line width of 1.2 microns. The production capacity of the monthly cast film is 5 thousand tablets. Due to the peak of the silicon cycle in 1995, the price of chip in the international market is high, so the sales of the first year of Shougang is more than 900 million yuan. In order to keep the leading position in the domestic industry and reach the international advanced production level, at the end of 1995, Shougang negotiated with NEC and invested 12 billion yen to upgrade and expand the technology. The move is mainly to increase the chip production technology level from 1.2 microns to 0.7 microns, and the packaging level of dynamic RAM is upgraded from 4M to 16M. In exchange for NEC technology, Shougang agreed to change the shareholding structure of Shougang electric. As a result, the registered capital of Shougang Group increased from 8 billion 675 million yen to 15 billion 975 million yen, and the proportion of capital investment from Shougang Group decreased from 60% to 49%, and NEC increased from 40% to 51%. After such efforts, Shougangs monthly packaging capacity increased to 6 million 700 thousand, and the monthly production capacity increased to 8 thousand. Try to be independent NEC is a large-scale electronic enterprise from chip research and development, design, manufacture to application. It is very strange to the mode of production. In fact, this mode also does not conform to NECs business strategy and interests. The purpose of Shougang joint venture with NEC is to achieve industrial transformation. It is not only against the OEM mode, but also very popular. Therefore, there is a big gap between the two sides in the issue of subcontracting production. In order to realize the strategic goal of the scale and benefit of the high-tech industry represented by the information industry before and after 2010, the scale and benefit of the high tech industry, which is represented by the information industry, will never relax the efforts to improve the ability to develop, design and produce chips. In 1999, NEC was affected by the depression of the worlds semiconductor market, especially in the case of the rapid increase of the strength of smuggling in China. Shougang (Shougang) quickly realized the transformation of the business strategy from the single return of the product to the domestic market and the domestic market. In this year, the production lines of the pre and post process of Shougang were all open to the outside world, and they accepted the work of a number of companies, and their general chips have also passed the recognition of famous enterprises such as Compaq, HP and IBM with excellent quality. But in 2000, with the recovery of the semiconductor boom and the increase of NECs order, Shougang was forced to discontinue its business to meet NECs chip production demand. To achieve the strategic goal of industrial transformation, Shougang is looking forward to a 8 inch, 0.25 micron chip, which is the highest technology in the United States and other developed countries that could tolerate the transfer to China at that time. At the first fourteen session of Shougang in mid January 2000, the general manager of Shougang made it clear in the report that it should actively arrange to start the construction of a 8 inch, 0.25 micron chip production line project and accelerate the construction of the microelectronic production base. In May of the same year, the Symposium on the construction of the North microelectronics industry base was held in Shougang. The municipal government of Beijing, the leading representative of the city, made a clear statement to support the 8 - inch, 0.25 - micron project on Shougang. With the strong support of the Beijing municipal government, Shougang resolutely shouted the slogan Shougang future is not surnamed steel. In December 2000, three foreign companies, such as Shougang general company, Shougang Limited by Share Ltd, Shougang High Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing state asset management company and American AOS semiconductor company, established the Beijing Hua Xia semiconductor manufacturing Limited by Share Ltd (HSMC), with a total investment of $1 billion 335 million. According to the stock announcement of Shougang, the capital is partly funded by 3 Shougang company, and the AOS semiconductor company in the United States provides intellectual property, and the other two overseas companies contribute 100 million dollars respectively. The state-owned assets management company of Beijing has invested $45 million and the rest is made up of bank loans. The newly established Huaxia semiconductor project was first launched to build two chip production lines, 8 inches and 0.25 microns. It was put into operation in 2002. In 2004, it was able to form 45 thousand pieces of monthly cast film, and then two chip processing plants were built. At the same time, Shougang also promoted Shougang to upgrade the 6 inch chip production project from 0.35 microns to 0.25 microns. On this basis, a chip production line of 8 inches and 0.25 microns was built to form a complementary potential with the Chinese semiconductor. Abandon the core dream But in 2001, the global slide of the semiconductor industry reversed the situation. This year, global semiconductor sales decreased from US $200 billion in 2000 to US $140 billion. As a result of this rare slump, the AOS company in the United States took the lead in giving up the investment in the Chinese project, which led to the failure of the project to deliver and undertake the commitment to intellectual property rights, affecting the progress of the project. Then another two overseas investors also withdrew from the international chip market downturn. To this end, finding new partners has become a top priority for Shougang. Shougang shares have been negotiating with many foreign companies such as the United States, Holland and Japan, but failed to make substantial progress. Here, Chinas plan to acquire a semiconductor production line of Korea modern company has not been realized. Since then, the Chinese semiconductor project has been in a deadlock. The semiconductor downturn in 2001 also led to the deterioration of NECs performance. Therefore, NEC has again been drastically reduced to Shougangs order. In this case, Shougang (Shougang) had to accept foreign agent business again, its 6 inch chip upgrade project continued, but the 8 inch chip project had to be postponed, and eventually forced to cry out in May 2003. Japanese journalists, who have long tracked the semiconductor industry, believe that the international semiconductor market is severely shrinking, and NEC chips are producing huge losses, leading to NEC as the top priority for achieving profit. At this point, additional investment and upgrading of technology will hardly be the subject of policy makers, and NEC has already launched a 8 inch chip project in Shanghai with Huahong joint venture. Whether from the overall development strategy or from recent years operation, it is impossible for NEC to build another 8 inch production line in Shougang. After more than a year of losses, at the end of 2002, the general assembly of Shougang Group changed its voice and began to voice its return to the iron and steel industry. In January 2003, Shougang announced that it would spend 500 million yuan on Beijing Hyundai Motor Co. In this way, the 8 inch chip project of Shougang is actually shelved. In October 26, 2004, Beijing Shougang was announced in the form of an announcement that the 8 inch chip project intended to be invested by the raised funds was given up by the foreign companies because of the changes in the market. And decided to invest 250 million yuan of funds raised for the project to the technical transformation project of high-grade mechanical steel. This shows that Shougang is no longer spoony in the high-tech chip industry. Analysis and discussion Worldwide, there are many large iron and steel enterprises involved in the semiconductor industry. Japanese steel enterprises, such as Japanese steel pipe, Nippon Steel, Kawasaki iron, Sumitomo Metal and Kobe steel, have also invested in semiconductor industry in the mid and late 80s of last century. Taiwan Sinosteel also introduced German technology in 1994 to start producing 8 inch chips. However, all these enterprises have suffered setbacks. Why have these big steel companies suffered setbacks in the transformation of semiconductor industry? To answer this question, it is necessary to start with the main factors that affect technological transformation: national strategy, technological learning and cultural locking. (1) national strategy A common cause for iron and steel enterprises to abandon the chip industry is to give up weak related diversification. In the final analysis, it is the Logical Consideration of maximizing shareholder value and stripping off assets that are not profitable in the short term. From a companys financial point of view, this is right, which is responsible for shareholders. Most of Beijings semiconductor giants eventually stripped semiconductor research and development and began to develop real estate. Among these giants, they are the only ones who have survived the worlds semiconductor industry. From the perspective of financial rationality, BOE is not a successful company. Investors who bought BOE shares criticized the company for years. It has a lot of opportunities to develop real estate, but it goes against the sky to engage in technology. Without the insistence of BOE, there would be no LCD panel industry in China today. Corporate profits are understandable, and they need to be accountable to shareholders. If the high-tech industry cannot be nurtured by market, it needs state support and can not allow the logic of the market to eliminate possible technological innovations. After the Beijing semiconductor giants have become the real estate giants, the national support for the research and development of the chip is mainly reflected in the support of some key laboratories and the support of the chip research and development of the dragon core, which are related to the security field. Topic system and key support methods only solve the chip safety problems in some fields, but can not solve the industrialization problem. If the country lacks the strategy of taking the semiconductor industry, especially the integrated circuit industry as a pillar industry, the industrialization of high technology is empty talk. Without high and new technology industrialization, we can not supply enough high - end R & D posts. The talents trained by the country have to be transferred, so that the industrialization of high and new technology is more difficult to realize. As a result, this vicious circle is hard to break. China has just joined the WTO at the time of collective housing for the capital semiconductor giants, and we have not yet realized that the core technology can not be made up to the importance of the people, and that the industry is not sufficiently supported on the strategic level. (2) technical learning The establishment of mass production in iron and steel industry began in the latter half of the nineteenth Century, and has only completed two major technological innovations. As the technological change is very small, the renewal of production equipment in iron and steel enterprises is very slow. However, the production of semiconductor materials with the same raw material for industrial production shows different characteristics. The speed of equipment renewal is much higher than that of iron and steel enterprises. The size of silicon produced in 1958 was usually only 15 millimeters in diameter, but increased to 50 mm in 1968, and increased to 150 millimeters in the late 70s, and up to 200 mm and 300 mm in 1986 and 1996. Once the diameter of silicon single crystal is raised, the production equipment must be upgraded accordingly. The problem is that integrated circuit production equipment updates faster than silicon chips. For example, the capacity of dynamic RAM has increased rapidly in the past 20 years, that is, increasing 4 times every 3 years. Such a growth rate will lead to the risk of elimination after three years of operation of semiconductor production equipment. In addition, the geometric dimensions and machining accuracy of the steel industry and the semiconductor industry are also quite different. Since the upgrading of technology and equipment in the semiconductor industry is much higher than that of the steel industry, it has set up a major problem for the iron and steel enterprises to enter the field of semiconductor processing in the way of imitating innovation. That is, after the introduction of technology and equipment, how to digest and absorb quickly, and form independent innovation ability before the technology and equipment are eliminated. Otherwise, there will be no escape from the vicious circle of introduction, backwardness, reintroduction, and further backwardness. Semiconductor processing technology and equipment are extremely expensive, and no enterprise can afford continuous and repeated introduction. In order to avoid continuous introduction, enterprises must work hard in technical learning. There have been many discussions about technology learning mode at home and abroad, but all of them have neglected the speed or time of technological learning. Because of the backward technology, the enterprises introduce technology and equipment by direct purchase or joint venture. Even the most advanced technology and equipment are introduced. During the digestion and absorption of the imported technology, the technology and equipment of the export enterprises are usually developed. It is the form between the imported and the output enterprises. It has become a certain technical gap. If the output of the enterprise is not the most advanced technology and equipment, the technical gap between the two sides will be greater. The greater the technology gap between the importing enterprises and the exporting enterprises, the more unfavorable the formation of the market competitiveness of the imported enterprises will be. Therefore, the introduction of enterprises must strive to narrow the gap between the output and the enterprises. There are two ways: first, to start a new round of technology introduction; two, to form independent innovation ability through technological learning. Shougang has obtained complete sets of semiconductor processing equipment and corresponding technology from NEC. These devices and technologies were not the most advanced at the time, but at the beginning of the acquisition, it was advanced, at least not backward, otherwise Shougang would not pay so much for it. In addition, Shougang has made many preparations for importing semiconductor technology and laid a good foundation for technology introduction. So, in the early years of entering the semiconductor industry, they realized a certain degree of profitability. The problem is that this good momentum has not been maintained. The main reason is that semiconductor processing equipment and technology update speed too fast, although Shougang company has formed a certain technical learning foundation in the field of semiconductors, but it is difficult to effectively digest, absorb and improve the imported technology in a very short time with their technical strength and economic strength, so it can not be quickly reduced. The technical gap with the mainstream semiconductor manufacturers. Semiconductor production equipment will face the danger of elimination after three years of operation. Without a strong technical team, it is impossible to adapt to such rapid equipment updating and technical upgrading. Although Shougang has strong economic strength, it has little advantage in the storage and training of semiconductor talents. Because of its inability to rely on its own strength to narrow the technical gap through technical learning, Shougang is willing to exchange the holding power of Shougang to replace the new generation of semiconductor processing technology of NEC. It is difficult to win the long-term competition after the introduction of technology, even if it is unable to quickly form a technological innovation ability through technical learning, even if it can be temporarily removed from the difficult situation of technical backwardness by means of reintroduction. (3) cultural locking In the course of its development, enterprises will gradually form a cultural lock. This cultural lock will provide a competitive advantage for the development of enterprises in specific areas, but it will also become an obstacle for enterprises to promote diversification strategy. Because cultural locking can easily lead to stereotyped thinking and decision rigidities, weaken the innovation ability of enterprises, and reduce the enthusiasm of enterprises in carrying out technological transformation. Because enterprises have made huge investments in existing technology, and thus gain social identity and wealth, people are usually reluctant to transfer resources from areas that have already been successful to new, unconfirmed areas and are more willing to put the main energy and resources on the maintenance of existing production systems. Improvement. Even the decision-makers of enterprises are far sighted and willing to promote diversification strategy and implement technological transformation to promote sustained and stable development of enterprises. However, the cultural traditions that have been formed for a long time can not be changed overnight, especially when the culture has been breeds success. Therefore, when promoting diversification strategy, enterprises are facing not only technological transformation but also cultural transformation. If the corporate culture before transformation can not be rapidly reformed, then it can easily become an obstacle to technological transformation, leading to the eventual failure of technological transformation. Chip manufacturing industry is an industry with rapid product updating, strong market volatility, emphasis on strain ability and core technology, while steel industry is a more stable, safer and more planned industry for production and sales. The rapid renewal of semiconductor products and the violent fluctuation of market market demand that the enterprise decision level that is committed to entering the semiconductor industry and hope to have a foothold in the fierce competition can make an accurate expectation for the development prospect of the product, and also make a timely and appropriate response to the rapidly changing market. Not only that, it also requires the enterprise to have a strong and efficient management team, as well as the pursuit of dynamic growth of the business philosophy and the innovative culture and innovation mechanism to adapt to it. However, for those iron and steel enterprises wishing to promote diversification strategy, it is not easy to do this. Because iron and steel enterprises pay attention to the stability and safety of production. To achieve this goal, iron and steel enterprises have formulated a series of corresponding rules and regulations and put them into practice. Over time, a culture of caution and safety is formed inside the enterprise. The result of stability and fear of turbulence is that the response of steel enterprises to market changes and technological upgrading is far less sensitive than that of semiconductor enterprises. Semiconductor companies require decision-makers and management to respond promptly and quickly to the rapid changes in the market and the rapid updating of technology. Although some of the managers of Shougang are from NEC, most of the managers come from Shougang Group (772 employees, only 14 Japanese employees). They have been working in Shougang for many years and are deeply influenced by Shougangs corporate culture. As for Shougangs Huaxia project, it is almost entirely a decision made by Shougang. Although the corporate culture of Shougang has brought its brilliance to it, the cultural differences between the iron and steel enterprises and the semiconductor enterprises are very different, so it is very difficult to implement the transformation, especially in the case of a given transition time. Since the newly established semiconductor industry department can not overcome the influence of the iron and steel business management personnel, it is difficult to overcome the influence of the decision-making style and work habits of the iron and steel enterprises, that is, it is impossible to break through the original enterprise culture successfully in the short term, so the new cause is unavoidable. (4) conclusion Through the above investigation, we can basically conclude that: 1, for the high-tech industry such as chips, as a latecomer country, no strategic support from the government is difficult to sustain. Totally dependent on the market, the chip manufacturing industry of the first developing countries has the possibility of financial problems. If we do not want to be controlled by others, the country needs strategic determination. 2. To choose the way of imitating innovation, although we can bypass the risk that the investment is likely to encounter in the R & D of original technology, it is also necessary to pay high learning costs in the process of technology learning, and after paying these learning costs, it is not possible to create independent innovation in the renewal cycle of the introduction of technology and equipment. Ability is likely to fall into the passive situation of backward technology again. 3, talents and enterprises that succeed in one field may not be able to achieve the same success in a less relevant field. Different types of enterprises have different requirements for talents and corporate culture. In promoting diversification strategy, enterprises must properly handle the mobilization and matching of personnel so as to form a new type of enterprise culture suitable for the development of the target industry. Source: intellectual editor: Bai Xin _NT4464 1, for the high-tech industry such as chips, as a latecomer country, no strategic support from the government is difficult to sustain. Totally dependent on the market, the chip manufacturing industry of the first developing countries has the possibility of financial problems. If we do not want to be controlled by others, the country needs strategic determination. 2. To choose the way of imitating innovation, although we can bypass the risk that the investment is likely to encounter in the R & D of original technology, it is also necessary to pay high learning costs in the process of technology learning, and after paying these learning costs, it is not possible to create independent innovation in the renewal cycle of the introduction of technology and equipment. Ability is likely to fall into the passive situation of backward technology again. 3, talents and enterprises that succeed in one field may not be able to achieve the same success in a less relevant field. Different types of enterprises have different requirements for talents and corporate culture. In promoting diversification strategy, enterprises must properly handle the mobilization and matching of personnel so as to form a new type of enterprise culture suitable for the development of the target industry.