Chow en Lai was one of the volunteers who won the war

category:Military
 Chow en Lai was one of the volunteers who won the war


The war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea is a war in which the economic strength and military technical equipment of both sides are greatly different. In terms of the logistics support for the war, the two sides are very different.

Compared with all kinds of canned food, instant food and even coffee and chewing gum in the mouth of the U.S. Army, fried noodles, which are the main rations of the volunteers, are almost the simplest and most primitive food. A handful of fried noodles and a handful of snow is the most real and concise portrayal of the hardships of the war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea.

It was fried noodles that solved the minimum material support for the army. Along with the soldiers bloody struggle, a handful of fried noodles and a handful of snow and fried noodles and rifles drove away the ambitious Wolves of the United States.

Fried noodles is a great contribution to the victory of the volunteer army in the war.

The volunteers fighting in the front line, a handful of fried noodles and a handful of snow, eat and sleep in the open air. Photo by Li Xi

In the rear of the motherland, the volunteers rushed to make fried noodles.

Volunteers use dry food bags to get fried noodles.

The fireline transporters braved the gunfire and carried supplies to the front line.

Recipes from the old Red Army

Before the army moves, grain and grass go first. War is inseparable from logistics.

In mid October 1950, before the volunteers entered the DPRK, the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region had a total of 16700 tons of grain, 400 tons of cooking oil and 920 tons of dry vegetables in the border areas. The reserves of these materials played an important role in ensuring the initial supply of the volunteers for overseas operations.

However, after the volunteers entered Korea and the war was fully launched, the logistics still greatly hindered the volunteers.

During the period of the Civil Revolutionary War, our armys supply mode was mainly to get and take from the enemy on the spot. The image saying is millet plus rifle, warehouse in front. However, during the war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, the Chinese peoples Volunteer Army, which went abroad for the first time, continued to use the old method of raising food on the spot and solving the problem of food supply for the troops respectively. The supplies of the volunteer army depend on the domestic supply. The transportation line is long and the supply task is heavy. In particular, relying on the advantages of the Navy and air force, the enemy took destroying the rear supply of the volunteer army as a strategic policy. Thousands of aircraft bombed indiscriminately day and night, and implemented a three-dimensional blockade of hanging lights in the sky, scattering nails on the road, and blasting pits underground.

In the early days of the war, half of the 400 vehicles that volunteers used to transport materials were lost just three days after the beginning of the war.

Because the logistics can not keep up with the situation, the front-line troops often run out of food and food. In the course of the first campaign, the 42nd army was forced to dig potatoes for starvation for three or four days. Seven battalions of the 40th army starved for three days.

Hong Xuezhi, then deputy commander of the Chinese peoples Volunteer Army, was in charge of the logistics work. He was under great pressure and was extremely anxious. In his memoir of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, he recorded several times that Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief of the volunteer army, was furious. I know all the problems with the logistics supply, he said, we also thought of many ways ahead However, due to the fact that there are too many objective difficulties, they have not been able to fundamentally solve the problem.

Li Jukui, head of Logistics Department of the Northeast military region, is under greater pressure. In the early stage of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region was responsible for the logistics support of the volunteer army. The supply of hundreds of thousands of troops preparing for the first batch of troops to enter the DPRK has made the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region seem to be on the top of the mountain. However, the objective difficulties of too much and too big facing the logistics problems now are on the top of Li Jukui, the first person responsible.

Objective difficulties can be summed up as follows: on the battlefield, the U.S. planes were bombed wildly, and the supply lines were damaged seriously; the troops moved continuously and had no time to cook; the lights and smoke of cooking fires easily exposed the targets and led to enemy aircraft bombing.

In view of these problems, biscuits are actually very suitable for battlefield rations. The Logistics Department of northeast military region tried to organize biscuit production and supply. However, the practical problems lie there: the cost of biscuits is high, the production is relatively complex, and the biscuits are bulky, inconvenient to carry, and difficult to meet the needs of the army.

Besides biscuits, is there any convenient food that is cheap, easy to produce and easy to carry? Li Jukui really thought of it.

Li Jukui was an old Red Army who participated in the revolution in 1928. As he pondered over the provision and supply of the volunteer army, he suddenly thought that more than ten years ago, the Western Route Army was defeated in Qilian Mountain, and the army was scattered. He had to beg alone along the way to find the Party Central Committee. On the way, he had several fried noodles given by local people in Qinghai and Ningxia. Fried noodles and water can be eaten, easy to carry, easy to save, and simple processing, which is in line with the current needs of the volunteer army.

Li Jukui first instructed the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region to produce and process a batch of samples in accordance with the ingredients of 70% wheat, 30% soybean, corn or sorghum. After these mixed grains are fried and ground, and then added with 0.5% salt, it becomes a convenient field food, fried noodles, which is easy to preserve, transport and eat. After the samples were transported to the front line, they were welcomed by the commanders and fighters because they could avoid exposing the target by cooking smoke and were convenient to eat.

Peng Dehuai and other leaders of the headquarters of the volunteer army were also very happy after seeing the samples. The fried noodles samples had a good effect in the front-line troops. General manager Peng specially asked deputy commander Hong Xuezhi to send a telegram to the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region, telling them: bring in the dried grain, grind it into flour and put salt in it. When frying, you should wash it first and send a large amount of it forward.

Fried noodles, thus boarded the stage of war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea.

Every family is busy with fried noodles

According to the opinion of the headquarters of the volunteer army, large quantities of fried noodles were supplied to the front line in late November 1950, around the launch of the second campaign.

To this end, the Northeast Peoples Government specially issued several provisions on the implementation of fried noodles. According to the regulations, the task of making fried noodles is distributed to all levels of the party, the government, the army and the people, and the daily quantity of fried noodles is assigned to each unit.

In the course of the second campaign, the Northeast Bureau of the Communist Party of China held a special meeting. The participants included leaders of the party, government and army in Northeast China. Zhou Enlai, premier of the Government Council, came from Beijing to attend. The name of the meeting was fried noodles and boiled meat meeting.

The task of producing 6.5 million kilograms of fried noodles and 520000 kilograms of cooked meat in one month has been arranged for the fried noodles and meat cooking conference.

Even so, if every volunteer soldier on the front line could eat fried noodles, the amount of fried noodles needed would be amazing. Even if it is supplied at one-third of the prescribed amount per person per month, the figure has reached 7.41 million kg. Because of the huge demand and the need to be ready in a short period of time, the Logistics Department of the Northeast military region can not catch up even if it tries its best. The Northeast Peoples government has mobilized all forces, but it can only solve 5 million kg at most, so there is a big gap.

When Premier Zhou Enlai learned of this situation, he immediately instructed the Government Council to assign tasks to the northeast, North China and central and southern provinces to mobilize the masses to fry noodles.

On the evening of November 17, the Government Council issued a task to all localities to speed up the production of 600000 kilograms of fried noodles within a week and send them to the front line, of which Beijing undertook 50000 kilograms.

Just three days later, on November 20, the order issued by the Government Affairs Council doubled again, deciding to increase the task of 1.2 million kilograms of fried noodles, and to double the tasks assigned to all localities in proportion.

Therefore, in the snow in the winter of 1950, a large-scale mass movement was launched in China: men, women, old and young worked together, every household cooked fried noodles, and even the streets and alleys set up a large pan of fried noodles, day and night. The unique fragrance of fried noodles spreads over the vast land of China.

Premier Zhou Enlai also personally went to some organs in Beijing to inspect the implementation of fried noodles, and personally started to stir fry noodles with the comrades of the organs. Premier Zhou Enlai once suffered a wound in his left arm. When frying noodles, he only relied on his right arm, and the sweat on his face went down. A female comrade came forward to grab the shovel in his hand. Premier Zhou said, it doesnt matter. Were a little tired at home, its nothing. The volunteers are very hard at the front line. They should make fried noodles and use them as dry food to support them in winning the battle.

Under Zhou Enlais personal care and instruction, the first batch of 2000 tons of fried noodles was delivered to the volunteers in just over 20 days.

With fried noodles, when fighting, soldiers carry a bag of fried noodles. When they are hungry, they hold a handful of fried noodles and put them in their mouths. After eating a few mouthfuls of snow, they can insist on marching. Although fried noodles are extremely simple and crude field food, they are full of the deep feelings of the people of the motherland, which greatly encourages the officers and men of the volunteer army to fight with blood.

On December 23, 1950, when the second campaign was about to win, in order to continue to prepare for the third campaign, general manager Peng asked Hong Xuezhi to draft a report to the Central Military Commission and the Northeast military region on his behalf. The report pointed out: all troops are very grateful for the fried noodles sent by the northeast. Please send me fried noodles with soybeans and rice with salt in the future

According to statistics, from the entry of the volunteers into the DPRK to the end of the fifth campaign in June 1951, more than 30000 tons of dry grain of this kind were transported, accounting for 16.7% of the total grain transported before, most of which were fried noodles. Hong Xuezhi once said with emotion: if there is no fried noodles, we cant solve the minimum living guarantee for the army.

The volunteer army is the minimum living guarantee, but the United Nations army headed by the US Army has sufficient and abundant logistic supplies.

The food eaten by the U.S. military on the Korean battlefield is usually canned, which can be divided into two categories. One is the M-series canned food, which is mainly made of meat, and the B-series canned food mainly consists of candy and instant drinks such as coffee, cocoa powder or lemon powder. Each soldier has three m cans and three B cans a day, along with chewing gum, chocolate, napkins and other accessories. If its a holiday, there will be extra holiday meals, such as a Thanksgiving dinner for ordinary soldiers. The menu is roast turkey, French fries, beef pie, salad, fruit cake, and even a cocktail.

It was on the basis of the minimum living guarantee that the Chinese peoples volunteer army launched five successive campaigns after entering the DPRK, annihilating more than 230000 United Nations and South Korean troops, and stabilizing the front line in the north and south of the 38th parallel.

Logistics Command

Although the volunteers have fried noodles, eating is still a big problem. Even fried noodles are not what you want to eat.

There is a tradition of our army that has been used for decades in the dress of the Volunteer Army: the dry grain bag on the cross arm. From the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the war of resistance against Japan to the war of liberation, this bag of dry food has always been the standard configuration of soldiers. In the case of serious shortage of logistics supplies, this humble cloth bag is even more important. The volunteers must rely on the dry food in the pocket to maintain their life.

A dry grain bag can usually hold dry food for five to seven days. Due to the poor supply conditions of the volunteers, the soldiers mainly rely on their own supplies and ammunition, which can only last for a week at most, and then the offensive will inevitably stop. Therefore, it is called worship offensive by the US Army.

The enemys frenzied bombing of the supply lines and warehouses of the volunteers caused great losses to the supplies of the volunteers. Hong Xuezhi recalled that during the whole war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, only 60.70% of the materials supplied from the rear went to the front line, and 30.40% of the materials were destroyed on the way In the days of food shortage, Hong Xuezhi, who was in charge of the logistics work of the volunteer army, reported the situation of grain to Peng Dehuai twice a day, including how much grain had been transported from the rear, whether it had been transported, and how much it had been sent to the front-line troops.

In late April 1951, Hong Xuezhi returned home to report his work to the Central Committee. At present, soldiers are afraid that they have no food to eat, and that they are afraid that they will not be able to carry them down after being injured.

At that time, it was in the midst of the fifth campaign. Hong Xuezhi was also entrusted by Peng Dehuai to send more logistics and transportation support teams to the central leaders, such as air defense force, communication force, railway force and engineering force. At the same time, he proposed to establish a logistics command to command the logistics support of the volunteer army.

After listening to Hong Xuezhis report, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai immediately accepted all the reports and immediately started to assign and implement them. When Hong Xuezhi returned to North Korea and the volunteer army headquarters held a meeting to study the organization and personnel arrangement of the logistics command, Peng Dehuai got angry again - the logistics commander had no one to do it.

The three deputy commanders of the volunteer army, Deng Hua, Han Xianchu and Hong Xuezhi, each have their own division of labor. Hong Xuezhi was originally in charge of logistics, and he was also the logistics commander. Naturally, several heads of the volunteer army also agreed. But Hong Xuezhi himself stubbornly refused, for no other reason: a while ago, let me manage, I didnt manage well.

After several rejections, Peng Dehuai was angry, patted the table and roared: you dont do it? OK! You dont have to do it! Ill do it. Youll command the troops.

Seeing that the logistics commander couldnt refuse, Hong Xuezhi had no choice but to take over. However, he also made a bargain with Peng Dehuai: the first is to quit my post early if I cant do a good job, and change to a comrade who is more capable than I am; second, when the war against US aggression and aid Korea is over, dont let me do logistics, but let me engage in military affairs.

Peng Dehuai laughed and said, is that the condition? Yes, yes

Smash strangulation

In May 1951, the PLA logistics command was established, with Hong Xuezhi as the commander. However, the two qualifications he offered were not fulfilled.

Hong Xuezhi became Vice Minister and Minister of the General Logistics Department of the PLA after he returned to the country successfully to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. In 1955, Hong Xuezhi was awarded the rank of general. After the Cultural Revolution, Hong Xuezhi was once again the head of the General Logistics Department. In 1988, the PLA restored the rank system, and Hong Xuezhi was awarded the rank of general again. He became the only general with two posts of logistics minister and two generals in military history.

As for I cant do well, I cant quit my job earlier. It was in the war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea that our army took the first step of modern logistics support. Hong Xuezhi also became a pioneer in modern logistics work of the PLA.

After the establishment of the logistics command, the supply system and methods of supplies for the volunteer army began to undergo fundamental changes. On the one hand, the past follow-up support mode and the supply method of setting up supply stations should be transformed into a supply system that combines district supply with organic supply; on the other hand, the construction of the transport line connecting the front and back of the station should be transformed into the construction of a transport network connecting the front and rear as well as the left and right, so as to agglomerate various scattered support forces into a multi-level, multi-channel and multi-hand mode Section of the overall security.

The US military has never stopped destroying the logistics supplies of the volunteers. Especially during the fourth and fifth campaigns, the enemy also saw the logistics weakness of the volunteers. The number of US aircraft increased to more than 2000, and launched the strangulation targeting the logistics of the volunteers. The attack on the logistics transportation line became more and more crazy.

The U.S. military has classified the 38 to 39 degrees north latitude as the main block area. Every bridge in the block area, every passing train and truck, is their target. On average, a bomb exploded within two meters.

In the U.S. militarys block zone, they control the air. On the one hand, the volunteer army strengthened the ground air defense forces, on the other hand, it launched the highly efficient infrastructure work of repairing bridges and roads.

During the two years from the establishment of the logistics command to the armistice, the railway soldiers of the volunteer army repaired 666 kilometers of damaged railways and more than 1700 times, and repaired bridges of up to 120 kilometers and 2200 seats. Connecting these bridges is the same distance as Beijing to Tianjin.

When the volunteers first entered Korea, they followed the practice of the civil war period. In addition to limited automobile transportation, they used a large number of carriages and manpower. Under the condition that the U.S. military has absolute control over the air, this approach will not work at all. The efficiency of carriage transportation is not enough for its own consumption, so it is gradually replaced by automobile transportation. And in the U.S. aircraft under the straying bombing, the loss of cars is also amazing.

North Korea has many mountains and narrow roads. Among the trucks of the volunteer army, the Soviet gas with a load of two tons is small and can barely pass by on the road. Its very difficult for a four ton large car to miss. There are often traffic jams. One block is several kilometers. If found by the enemy, throw bombs and strafe, dozens of vehicles will be destroyed in one go. At the beginning of entering the DPRK, there were a total of 500 trucks in each unit of the volunteer army. By the end of 1950, 600 trucks (including follow-up replenishment) were lost, with a loss rate of 120%.

Faced with this situation, in the autumn of 1951, the volunteer army ordered the second line troops to build roads, widening and building more than 2000 kilometers of roads. The team of automobile soldiers also grew rapidly, from 500 at the beginning to 17 automobile regiments and more than 3700 trucks.

Under the unified command of the logistics command and the close cooperation and joint efforts of all forces, 220000 logistics front commanders and fighters have built a steel transportation line with continuous fighting and no explosion on the battlefield of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, thus smashing the strangulation planned by the US military. The logistic support of the volunteer army changed from very weak at the beginning to relatively effective, and then to powerful support.

After November 1951, the volunteer armys grain supply was basically in accordance with the standard, and the raw grain increased, and the cooked grain was changed from fried noodles to compressed biscuits. By 1952, the supply of supplies had improved in an all-round way. Not only could grain and non-staple food be supplied according to the standard, but there was also a certain amount of savings to build up reserves. The soldiers and soldiers of the volunteer army had no problem eating and wearing warm clothes. In the Spring Festival of 1953, the front-line officers and men ate meat dumplings for the first time since entering the dynasty. Meat, vegetables and fruits are no longer extravagant expectations.

Even so, the supply of volunteers is still in the sky than the US military. But, it is these most lovely people, not to cry, not complain, to throw out hot blood, is to fight those who eat full and wear warm armed to teeth invaders have no temper!

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