Resisting US aggression and aiding Korea: one of the most difficult decisions in Mao Zedongs life

category:Military
 Resisting US aggression and aiding Korea: one of the most difficult decisions in Mao Zedongs life


At this time, new China just turned one year old. After more than a hundred years of humiliation and turbulence, the new China, which has been reborn from the ashes, is just a poor and destitute country. The peoples Republic, which has just been reborn from the war, is once again facing the test of blood and fire, and has to fight against the worlds number one power. What courage and courage is needed to make this determination. Should China send troops to resist US aggression and aid Korea? It was one of the most difficult decisions of Mao Zedongs life.

We have to be prepared

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. On June 27, the third day after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States sent its navy and air force to invade the territorial waters and airspace of the DPRK and attack the Korean peoples army. At the same time, under the order of President Truman, the seventh fleet of the United States Navy brazenly entered the Taiwan Strait, preventing any attack on Taiwan and openly interfering in Chinas internal affairs.

At this time, new China, which was still under one year old, had nothing to do with it, and did not want a war at all. However, the U.S. response leaves China absolutely no option to stay out of the way. China and North Korea are closely related to each other, and if the lips die, the teeth will be cold.. On the 28th, Mao Zedong clearly pointed out: Truman also declared on January 5 this year that the United States does not interfere in Taiwan. Now he has proved that it is false, and at the same time, he has torn up all international agreements of the United States on non-interference in Chinas internal affairs.

The rapid and strong response of the Chinese government failed to prevent the United States from continuing to expand the Korean War. On July 7, the United Nations Security Council adopted the so-called United Nations command in the absence of Soviet representatives, and appointed MacArthur as the commander-in-chief of the United Nations force the next day.

At the beginning of October 1950, the U.S. aggressor troops defiantly crossed the 38th line and burned the war to the Chinese border. On October 19, the Chinese peoples volunteers bravely crossed the Yalu River and fought with the Korean people against the invaders. Shen Jizhong

The civil war in neighboring countries has evolved into an imperialist war of aggression. The Chinese government has to take precautions. Almost at the same time as the establishment of the United Nations command, Mao Zedong agreed to transfer four armies, three artillery divisions and four anti-aircraft artillery regiments to form the northeast border defense army, which would arrive at the designated areas in Northeast China before August 5.

At this time, the central government had anticipated that the Korean war might be a protracted and complicated struggle. Sure enough, in August, the Korean peoples army gradually became locked up with the U.S. military and the South Korean army. On August 4, Mao Zedong pointed out at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee that if the US emperor wins, he will be proud and threaten our country. We must help the North Korea in the form of volunteer troops. Of course, we must choose the right time. We must be prepared.

Mao Zedong even prepared for the worst. On August 5, when he met Deng Hua, the leader of the northeast frontier army, he said: Truman will not stop in North Korea After you have assembled in Northeast China, your task is to defend the northeast border. However, you should be prepared to fight against the Americans, to fight an unprecedented war, and to prepare him to fight the atomic bomb. He hit the atomic bomb, we hit grenades, seize his weakness, follow him, and finally defeat him.

Mao Zedong said: our wish is not to fight, but you must fight, so you have to fight.

No telegram sent

On September 15, the US army landed from Incheon, North Korea, and occupied Seoul on the 28th. On the night of September 29, Mao Zedong received a report from Zhou Enlai: US imperialism has publicly indicated that it will march north of the 38th line... At the same time, since the end of August, fishermen in Northeast China, Shanghai, Shandong and other coastal areas have continuously found US aircraft or warships attacking.

The development of the situation has made the Chinese people intolerable. On September 30, Premier Zhou Enlai issued a stern warning to the United States: the Chinese people love peace, but in order to protect peace, they never and never fear resistance to the war of aggression. The Chinese people must not tolerate foreign aggression, nor allow imperialists to ignore their neighbors aggressive activities. In the early hours of October 3, Zhou Enlai urgently asked Indias ambassador to China to inform the United States: the American army is trying to expand the war beyond the 38th line. If the American army does, we cannot sit down and we should take care of it.

It is Chinas bottom line that the US military does not cross the 38th line. However, when the news reached Washington, arrogant Americans only regarded it as a game of diplomacy by China. In his memoir, Truman wrote that the United States believes that the possibility of Chinas sending troops to the war is very small and not enough to be a danger. The U.S. military on the Korean battlefield did not stop moving north. On the day of the first anniversary of the founding of new China, the South Korean army crossed the 38th line. MacArthur sent an ultimatum to the DPRK, demanding that the Korean peoples army lay down its weapons and stop fighting unconditionally. On the same day, Stalin called to suggest that China send at least 56 divisions to the 38th line. Soon, a top secret letter from Kim Il Sung was also sent to Mao Zedong: we have to ask you to give us special assistance, that is, when the enemy attacks the area north of the 38th line, we are eager for the Chinese peoples Liberation Army to directly send out to help our army fight.

Despite the preparation for the deployment, it is still a difficult decision to make a decision. Hu Qiaomu once said: I have worked with Chairman Mao for more than 20 years, and I remember that there are two things that are difficult for him to make up his mind. One was sending volunteers to fight in Korea in 1950, and the other was that in 1946 our party was ready to completely break up with the Kuomintang. Mao Zedong was very clear that the gap between China and the United States was too wide. In 1950, the total industrial and agricultural output value of the United States was 280 billion US dollars, while that of China was only 10 billion US dollars. The US military has an experienced air force, and the PLAs first air force has just been established. The United States has atomic bombs and the most advanced weapons and equipment. An army has more than 1000 guns with calibre of more than 70mm. On average, a PLA army has 36 such guns, and a northeast frontier army has only 190 at most.

On June 28, 1950, Mao Zedong delivered a speech denouncing the US aggression of interfering in the internal affairs of North Korea and obstructing the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people.

Under such conditions, is it advantageous to send troops to aid Korea? Will it lead the United States to declare war directly against China? All these problems need careful consideration, but Mao Zedong decided to send troops. In the early morning of October 2, Mao Zedong, who was convinced that our army had less steel and more gas, called Deng Hua to order the border defense forces to finish their preparations ahead of time and to be ready to go out at any time. At the same time, we drafted a telegram to Stalin, saying that we decided to aid Comrade Korea.

Unexpectedly, on the afternoon of October 2, when the Central Secretariat expanded its meeting, most of the participants were not in favor of sending troops. In the end, Mao Zedong could only obey the opinions of the majority. Instead of sending this telegram, Mao Zedong conveyed the opinions of the majority to Stalin through the Soviet ambassador to China Luo Shen: after careful consideration, we think that at present, it is better to restrain ourselves and not send troops for the time being..

Peng Dehuais support

Mao Zedong did not give up sending troops to aid Korea. In fact, at the end of his telegram to Stalin, he specially emphasized that no final decision has been made on this issue..

On October 4, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee again discussed the issue of sending troops at the Yinian Hall of Zhongnanhai. At that time, the majority of people who did not agree with or had various doubts about the deployment of troops were still in the majority. The main reasons were: China had just ended the war and its economy was very difficult and needed to be restored; the land reform in the new liberated areas had not been carried out, and bandits and secret agents had not been eliminated; our armys weapons and equipment were far behind the US Army, and there was no air and sea control power, etc. In short, their opinion is that it is better not to fight this war unless it is absolutely necessary.

In the middle of the meeting, Peng Dehuai arrived at the meeting. As the first Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the northwest military and political Commission, he was originally in Xian. He was suddenly taken to Beijing by plane at noon on the 4th. He didnt even know the content of the meeting in advance, so he just listened to everyones speeches. According to the recollections in Peng Dehuais autobiography, Chairman Mao told us to focus on the unfavorable situation of sending troops, and he said: you have reasons for what you said, but other people are in a state of crisis. We stand by and look at it. No matter what we say, we are also sad.

Is it to stand by or send troops to help? On that night, Peng Dehuai stayed in a Beijing Hotel, thinking about it and staying up all night. He repeated the chairmans words at the meeting for dozens of times, and finally decided to support the deployment of troops. Later, in his autobiography, he vividly described his thought at that time: tigers are going to eat people. When they eat depends on their intestines and stomachs. It is impossible to give in to them. Since it wants to invade, I will fight against it. Unlike US imperialism, it is difficult for us to build socialism.

The next morning, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai first exchanged views. Yang fengan, Peng Dehuais Military Secretary, recalled: two people were talking while eating. After Chairman Mao talked about the North Korea issue, Mr. Peng only said a word fight. . As soon as Chairman Mao heard that a typewriter suddenly appeared, he had a deep understanding.

In the afternoon, or in the Yi Nian hall, the participants still had two opinions. After several years of war, it is necessary for Peng to fight for victory. If the U.S. Army is on the Bank of the Yalu River and Taiwan, it can always find an excuse to launch an aggressive war. Finally, after full discussion, the meeting made a strategic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and protect the country, and decided to let Peng Dehuai lead the volunteer army to fight in North Korea.

A difficult and democratic decision-making was finally settled. Unexpectedly, the Soviet Union had another twists and turns.

Should participate in the war, must participate in the war

On October 8, Mao Zedong issued the order to the Chinese peoples Volunteer Army. Accordingly, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang immediately flew to Shenyang to convey the central governments decision to send troops to aid Korea. However, just when the army was ready, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang suddenly received an urgent telegram. Mao Zedong not only asked them to stay still, but also asked them to return to Beijing urgently.

It turned out that the Soviet air force assistance, which had been placed high hopes on, had failed. A few days ago, Zhou Enlai, on behalf of the Central Committee, flew secretly to the Soviet Union to discuss military material support, especially the issue of providing air force to cover the volunteer army. As a strategy of diplomatic negotiations, Zhou Enlai brought two opinions: if the Soviet Union intends to send air force support, he will talk about sending troops; if the Soviet Union is not willing to send air force support, it will not. As a result, the talks between the two sides were not smooth. On October 11, Zhou Enlai and Stalin jointly called Mao Zedong: the Soviet Union can fully meet the requirements of Chinas aircraft, tanks, artillery and other equipment, but the Soviet air force is not ready, and it can only be deployed in two or two and a half months.

Without the support of the Soviet air force, the volunteers would have been exposed to Americas powerful air firepower. On October 13, the Politburo held another emergency meeting. At this time, the U.S. military has crossed the 38th line and advanced to Yalu River and Tumen River, burning the flames of war to the door of China. Looking back on this period of history, Peng Dehuai said, as soon as the U.S. Army passes through the 38th line, I know that I cant do without fighting. Sure enough, everyone at the meeting agreed that even if the Soviet Union did not provide air support, we should still send troops to aid Korea. That night, Mao Zedong telegraphed Zhou Enlai the decision of the meeting: we believe that we should participate in the war, we must participate in the war. It is of great benefit to participate in the war, and it will do great harm if we do not participate in the war.

(function(){( window.slotbydup=window .slotbydup||[]).push({id:u5811557,container:ssp_ 5811557, async:true }The overall situation has been decided, but the twists and turns of air force support still worried Mao Zedong. He asked Zhou Enlai to stay in Moscow for a few more days, and confirmed with Stalin two questions: first, whether the Soviet Union provided weapons and equipment by lease or with money; second, whether the Soviet Union could really provide air support within two months or two and a half months. Sure enough, Stalin changed his mind again: the Soviet Union would only send its air force to China, and it would not be ready to enter the territory of North Korea after two months or two and a half months. This decision is just adding insult to injury for China. However, Mao Zedong and the Central Committee should not be allowed to waver in the war that has already burned to the Yalu River. On the 18th, US troops occupied Pyongyang. On the same day, the time for the volunteers to enter the DPRK was finally determined. On the night of October 19, 1950, 260000 Chinese peoples volunteers, who had already been placed in the northeast border area, crossed the Yalu River with manliness and vigor. Source: Beijing daily client editor: Li Xi_ NN2587

The overall situation has been decided, but the twists and turns of air force support still worried Mao Zedong. He asked Zhou Enlai to stay in Moscow for a few more days to confirm with Stalin two questions: first, whether the Soviet Union provided weapons and equipment by lease or by money; second, whether the Soviet Union could really provide air support within two months or two and a half months. Sure enough, Stalin changed his mind again: the Soviet Union would only send its air force to China, and it would not be ready to enter the territory of North Korea after two months or two and a half months.

This decision is just adding insult to injury for China. However, Mao Zedong and the Central Committee should not be allowed to waver in the war that has already burned to the Yalu River. On the 18th, US troops occupied Pyongyang. On the same day, the time for the volunteers to enter the DPRK was finally determined. On the night of October 19, 1950, 260000 Chinese peoples volunteers, who had already been placed in the northeast border area, crossed the Yalu River with manliness and vigor.