055 is far more than aircraft carrier guard with knife: US Army defines it as cruiser

 055 is far more than aircraft carrier guard with knife: US Army defines it as cruiser

In a blink of an eye, the eighth 055 was launched. In the 21st century, aircraft carrier and 055 are undoubtedly the most remarkable achievements of the Chinese navy. It is needless to say that Chinese aircraft carrier plays an important role in Chinas Navy strategy, but 055 is far more than a guard with a knife.

The U.S. Navy is built around aircraft carriers, and warships are defined by their role in carrier battle groups

But 055 is far more than a Chinese aircraft carriers armed guard

In World War II, the era of big ships and cannons was decisively ended by aircraft carriers. After the war, the surface power of the U.S. Navy has been built around aircraft carriers. Cruisers and destroyers are defined by their roles in aircraft carrier battle groups. Frigates are not included in the main warships at all. They are mainly used as convoys or antisubmarine patrols of merchant fleet. Even if they are promoted to aircraft carrier battle groups, they are only engaged in miscellaneous and torpedo defense. Even the main anti submarine force is Spruance class Like an antisubmarine destroyer.

However, in World War II, in addition to the carrier battle group (known as the task force in wartime), there were also surface battle groups (also known as sag). This is a surface combat formation that acts independently of the carrier battle group. Led by a cruiser or a destroyer, it is composed of several destroyers, often acting alone in an independent campaign direction.

Before the war, the basic idea of the U.S. Navy was not special. It was the fleet decisive battle. The role of destroyers envisaged before the war includes two aspects: providing anti submarine and air defense screen for battleships in the voyage; intercepting the enemys destroyer torpedo attack in the decisive battle of the fleet, and cooperating with the battleship of the team to launch torpedo attack on the enemy. The positioning of destroyers before war is actually equivalent to large ocean going torpedo boats, so it is not only responsible for torpedo attack, but also responsible for anti torpedo operations. The destroyer has larger tonnage than ordinary destroyers and has certain formation command ability, but it is still a torpedo boat with enlarged size.

In contrast, the positioning of a cruiser before the war is equivalent to that of a large ocean going gunship, with naval guns as the main weapon. Of course, the caliber and power of naval guns are lower than those of battleships. Cruisers can not only hunt in the ocean alone, but also attack the battleships in the decisive battle to weaken the enemys strength, so as to make the battleships launch the final fatal attack. For destroyers, when the enemys heavy cruisers attack with naval guns, the escorted destroyers should take the initiative to attack and drive away with torpedoes, but this is only defensive counterattack, which is a secondary task. The convoy of the merchant fleet was also a secondary task. Therefore, the wartime US destroyer is also called fleet destroyer.

During World War II, the U.S. Navy built a large number of destroyers, some of which broke away from the aircraft carrier and formed a surface battle group

In order to facilitate coordination of command, the U.S. Navy also invented the concept of combat intelligence center

However, in the actual combat of World War II, the four major tasks carried out by us destroyers basically deviated from the assumption before the war. Only to escort the main warships is the closest, but the main threat is not the torpedo attack on the surface, but the air attack. The second major task is to bombard the shore, which is no stranger to destroyers, but the scale used in wartime operations was not foreseen before the war. The same is true of anti submarine, which is the traditional task of destroyers, but it is not regarded as the main task in pre war thinking, and the anti submarine capability of destroyers before war is quite simple. The fourth major task is the surface battle group, which seeks and destroys the enemys surface battle group or transport fleet at sea. This was not foreseen before the war.

The existence of surface battle groups is due to the special power of torpedoes. Compared with shipborne guns, torpedoes are more powerful, but have a shorter range. Therefore, they are often used in night battles or smoke screens, which is convenient for destroyers to get close. In theory, its possible to avoid seeing a torpedos track, but its difficult at night or in smoke. Torpedoes can be sector salvo, as long as one hit, even large warships often lose combat effectiveness. The development of radar makes it more difficult for destroyers to make use of dark night approach. However, the experience of the US Navy in wartime shows that torpedoes are still useful weapons in naval warfare. Even after the war, the US Navy was reluctant to withdraw the multi mounted torpedo launch tubes on destroyers until the late 1950s.

In the Guadao naval battle, although the San Francisco fought bravely, it was confused and suffered a heavy blow


Major general Callahan died in battle and was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of honor

It also highlights the importance of combat intelligence center (CIC). In the Guadao naval battle on the night of November 13, 1942, major general Callahan (who was awarded the Congressional Medal of honor after his death in the battle) and the flagship heavy cruiser San Francisco did not control the battle situation very well. The position and course of the enemy and our ships were not clear. They not only mistakenly hit the friendly ship Atlanta light cruiser, but also killed major general Scott, as well It was hit 45 times and caught fire 22 times.

After the war, the importance of CIC was pointed out. According to the unified combat intelligence, CIC on each ship marked the position, trend and battle damage of all enemy and our warships, so as to facilitate timely, accurate and smooth unified command. This is particularly important for information sharing and night warfare in the era of radar. We should not rely on tactical broadcast channels, our own radars, and ship position estimation based on time and speed. It is not enough to master our own situation and perspective.

In the era of aircraft carrier, CIC plays a more important role in air defense and air sea cooperation. In the chaotic battle, it is extremely important to grasp and identify the position and situation of the enemy and ourselves in real time. In CIC mode, once the enemy or enemy and nature of the target are confirmed, it is no longer necessary to constantly verify. The track and direction of the target is often an important evidence of the enemy, the self and the state.

The surface battle group has made great achievements in the Pacific Naval Battle. During the battle of Vera Bay, Solomon Islands, on the night of August 6-7, 1943, the surface battle group composed of six US destroyers was divided into two teams to cover alternately, and launched an assault on the supply fleet of the Japanese Navys Tokyo express, and sank three of the four Japanese warships. During the battle of Queen Augusta off Bougainville island in the night of November 1-2, 1943, the U.S. Navy surface battle group torpedoed five Japanese ships under radar control, three of which sank, including the light cruiser chuannei. In the battle of suligo Strait on August 31, 1945, the surface battle group sank the battleship Shancheng and an accompanying destroyer.

Due to the great power of American destroyer torpedoes, in the battle of Samar during the battle of Leyte Bay on October 25, 1944, three American destroyers and three escort destroyers forced back the Japanese fleet. On March 26, 1943, in the battle of comandorsky, Aleutian Islands, the Japanese fleet gave up pursuit because of fear of torpedo attack by American destroyers.

After the war, the development of American destroyers was greatly influenced by the experience of wartime surface battle groups. One of the results was that the tonnage and firepower of American destroyers were significantly higher than those of other countries of the same era. The other was that there was a perfect operational command center to meet the independent operation requirements of the surface battle group. But after the war, the U.S. Navy rarely used destroyers as surface battle groups, basically returning to the traditional role of shielding fleet of aircraft carrier battle groups.

Under the condition of low intensity, the US destroyers sometimes act in independent formation or even single ship to display their power or attack small and weak countries from sea to land. However, this is different from the surface battle group. The surface battle group is aimed at high intensity combat. The semi military and semi police nature of low intensity conflict even destroyers are excessive firepower.

The lack of major surface fleet confrontation after the war is only half of the reason. Even in wartime, the development of naval aviation made the torpedo attack mode of Destroyer obsolete quickly. Destroyers only have relatively weak firepower of Shipborne guns, while torpedoes as the main means of attack can hardly survive against the surface fleet supported by carrier based aircraft or shore based aircraft.

The glorious time of the surface battle group was not long, and soon the destroyer returned to the traditional escort mission. Although the high-capacity vertical firing makes the US destroyers in the era of aegis have very strong combat effectiveness, long-range radar, information technology and networking have greatly improved the situation awareness of destroyers. The core of the combat effectiveness of the US Navy after the war is undoubtedly the aircraft carrier, and the surface battle group has not been recovered. This is determined by the US Navys focus on maritime control strategy.

The key point of maritime refusal is to prevent the other party from achieving strategic objectives through the sea. The strategic objectives here include maritime traffic lines, amphibious operations, and sea-based strike against land. Offshore defense and ocean attack are both maritime refusals. It is also a maritime refusal to force the other aircraft carrier to dare not enter its own coastal waters or even the middle and high seas by means of sea decisive battle and Assassins mace. Maritime refusal is defensive. From the German Navy in the two world wars, to the Soviet Navy in the cold war, and to the Chinese navy in the past few decades, they all adopted naval strategies based on maritime refusal. This is also a common naval strategy of continental countries. The main strategic direction is on land, and the ocean is only the strategic flank that must be covered.

The key point of maritime control is to ensure that one can achieve strategic goals through the sea. This is a common naval strategy of maritime countries. The ocean is the main strategic direction of attack, not just the strategic flank that needs to be covered. From the British navy in the British Empire to the US Navy since World War II, the strategic line based on maritime control is offensive, which is also the core of Mahans sea power.

Both maritime refusal and maritime control pursue sea control, but maritime refusal only requires dynamic and partial sea control, while maritime control seeks lasting and comprehensive sea control.

The Chinese navy is turning to an aircraft carrier centric architecture. Aircraft carrier itself does not solve the problem of maritime refusal or maritime control. Aircraft carrier can play a role in both naval strategies, but only the offensive naval strategy oriented to maritime control can give full play to the role of aircraft carrier. In other words, an aircraft carrier is not necessary for the purpose of maritime refusal. On the other hand, the surface battle group exists for maritime refusal.

The main task of the Chinese Navy used to be very simple: to defend coastal defense. Thats still important. The tragedy of modern China for 150 years started with the sea without defense. China cant repeat the same mistake. But fast forward to now, the main tasks of the Chinese navy have developed to:

1. Anti intervention

2. Armed reunification

3. Attack on land at sea

Anti intervention is a deep development of coastal defense, which extends not only from coastal defense to open sea, but also from sea to air and underwater. This is mainly aimed at US aircraft carriers, but it is more than that. The US F-15 fighters from Okinawa, the B-1 of lrasm launched from Guam and the B-52 that launched hypersonic missiles to the mainland, and B-2 and b-21, all of which are within the scope of anti intervention. The Virginia class nuclear submarines launching cruise missiles from the Western Pacific Ocean to the mainland are also fighting Within the scope of intervention. Anti intervention started in the Taiwan Strait and now extends to the South China Sea.

Armed reunification is, of course, aimed at Taiwan. This used to be a big challenge, but now, without the intervention of the United States, it is no longer a big challenge. So after the first task is completed, the second task will be easily solved.

Fighting hostile groups from the sea is a new task, which was originally extended from the first task. Anti intervention should not be passively beaten, but should take the initiative. This is what makes Chinas anti intervention unique. Okinawa is the first target, and it will also be the target if the Philippines re provides bases for US military intervention. If necessary, Guam, Hawaii and Australia are also targets. Similarly, if necessary, the semi military and non military strategic objectives needed by anti intervention can also be included in the scope of attack.

Anti intervention, armed unification and maritime strike on land do not directly lead to maritime refusal or maritime control. Maritime refusal and maritime control are not mutually exclusive. Strategic maritime refusal and tactical maritime control, or strategic maritime control and tactical maritime refusal, can exist. For the weak Chinese Navy, such a hybrid strategy is also necessary.

Chinas aircraft carrier power is still in its infancy, and its technical and operational levels are still in its infancy. However, Chinas security status can not wait. We must work in two ways. Maritime refusal and maritime control complement each other. The surface battle group with 055 as the core is the other.

As for the legendary 055 carrying anti-ship ballistic missiles, this may be just a legend. The anti-ship ballistic missile is also a ballistic missile. In the ascent and midcourse of launching, it still flies according to the simple trajectory. It only starts to maneuver when it is close to the end of the target. The vertical hair of 055 is 850 mm in large diameter, but it is still not enough to accommodate Dongfeng 21d and Dongfeng 26c with a diameter of 1.4 M. The tank gun can maintain the stability of the target in the course of running and bumping, and the direction depends on the automatic stability. However, the fixed vertical firing tube can not automatically stabilize, and can only sway with the ship in the wind and waves, which seriously affects the launching and hitting accuracy of anti-ship ballistic missile.

Haihongqi 9 has also set up a strong air defense network, which makes the air defense circle extend to the distance of offensive air defense. It not only establishes a strong fleet air defense, but also has the ability to cover coastal targets. A large number of close defense firepower is helpful to fill the gap of air defense firepower and kill the anti-ship missile and guided bomb which miss the net. Haihongqi 9 has anti missile potential, but there is no relevant report.

The anti submarine missile can provide long-range anti submarine firepower under the guidance of distant anti submarine helicopter and reduce the load of anti submarine helicopter. The antisubmarine helicopter which does not need to consider attacking submarine can greatly prolong the time of searching submarine and improve the efficiency of searching submarine.

However, the vertical firing capacity of 055 and destroyers is still limited, and they have the ability to launch sudden, violent and accurate fire attacks, including ground attacks. However, the sustainability and flexibility of firepower are still difficult to compare with aircraft carriers, and it is more dependent on aircraft carriers to maintain their strength for a long time. Numerous analyses have pointed out that once the conflict time is longer than a few to more than ten days, the efficiency of bombers is far higher than that of cruise missiles. This can also be extended to the comparison between shipboard aircraft and missiles.

055s intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities are also limited, and the aircraft carrier battle group is still unable to surpass in this respect. However, the problem of lack of early warning aircraft can be made up by UAV for sea and air alert within medium range. Global situation awareness is solved by satellite, hypersonic reconnaissance aircraft and orbital aircraft. With the support of network, the remote sensing ability of 055 is still very strong.

China has already built 8 055 and 25 052d ships, plus 6 052c and 2 051C, which greatly exceeds the need for the escort force of two aircraft carriers. New 003 and even 004 aircraft carriers are being built, but newer destroyers are also being designed and built, including the legendary all electric propulsion and even the 055 major modification equipped with electromagnetic guns. The Chinese navy has the conditions and the necessity to form a surface combat group. 055 is the core of the surface battle group of course, which is equivalent to the role of the destroyer or cruiser of the U.S. Navy in World War II.

The US naval surface battle group in World War II had two major elements of success, which are equally important today

1. Strong independent strike force and self-defense force

2. Matching intelligence and command and control capabilities

055 was built as the flagship of the aircraft carrier battle group. In the report on Chinese military forces issued by the US Department of defense, 055 was directly listed as a cruiser rather than a destroyer located by China. Its intelligence, command and control capabilities are beyond doubt. In addition to serving as the flagship in the carrier battle group, the surface battle group composed of destroyers such as 055 and 052c / D is also powerful in attack and self-defense. This is a powerful supplement to Chinas aircraft carrier battle group, and it is also a powerful force to attack the other sides amphibious battle group, surface battle group, transport fleet and anti submarine formation.

At present, Chinas aircraft carrier battle group is still growing, and the surface battle group has its special significance. Even if the combat effectiveness of Chinas aircraft carrier is formed in the future, the surface battle group is still important. In a long period of time, the Chinese navy may combine maritime refusal with limited maritime control to ensure that the U.S. Navy can not move freely in the Western Pacific, and at the same time establish and guarantee the ability to attack hostile groups from the sea under certain conditions. Therefore, the surface battle group is not an expedient measure.

In the Soviet Navy strategy, missile firepower is the main force and aircraft carrier is auxiliary. Although the carrier based fighters of the soviet-33 class have the ability to match the first-line carrier based fighters of the United States

In the U.S. Navy strategy, carrier based aircraft fire is the main force, although the missile firepower of shield ship is very strong

This is completely different from the Soviet Navy strategy in the era of aircraft carrier. The Soviet Navy has always been a maritime rejection strategy. Aircraft carriers exist to cooperate with missile firepower, so aircraft carriers are equipped with powerful missile firepower. On the one hand, carrier based fighters improve the expanded fleet air defense circle, on the other hand, they entangle each others carrier based fighters in the attack, creating opportunities for their own anti-ship missiles. The attack and air sea control capabilities of carrier based fighters have never been the focus.

On the contrary, the U.S. Navys strong missile firepower is to match the shipborne aircrafts firepower. It fills in the air in defense, opens the way for carrier based aircraft in attack, or entangles and distracts the other partys air defense firepower, creating opportunities for its own carrier based aircraft. Missile firepower is not the focus of the fleet.

The advantage of the Soviet model is that the firepower is fierce, but the disadvantage is the lack of durability and flexibility; the United States is the opposite. China, on the other hand, walks on two legs, which leg is easy to use. At the same time, it relies on land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles to conduct systematic operations.

At the same time, the US Navy has also put forward the concept of distributed lethality in view of the fact that the balance of power of the Asia Pacific Navy is constantly deviated from the absolute superiority of the United States and the number of aircraft carriers can not meet the needs. Its back to the surface battle group in a sense. This is not a simple reincarnation, but a common result of the new era, new conditions and new threats. But the U.S. Navy lacks enough destroyers.

The U.S. Navy is also trying to restore surface battle groups, but there are not enough warships

The US Navy has 11 aircraft carriers, 9 amphibious attack ships, 23 dock landing ships, 22 cruisers and 72 destroyers (including 69 Burke class and 3 jumwalt class). Littoral combat ships cannot be members of effective carrier battle groups or surface battle groups. Future frigates may be possible, but their speed can not keep up with aircraft carriers and destroyers.

The total number of aircraft carriers will be maintained at 10-11, and 11 will be maintained as far as possible. There is a general balance between the addition of new ships and the decommissioning of old ones, as well as amphibious attack ships and dock landing ships. After the decommissioning of the Iwo Jima and Tarawa classes, it is the turn of the hornet class. The construction of the U.S. class is roughly synchronized with the decommissioning of the hornet class. The total planned number of U.S. class ships is 11. The total number of San Antonio class plans is 26, including 11 completed, 2 under construction and 13 San Antonio II. The Harpers Ferry and Whitby classes will be gradually replaced, and the total number will be maintained at about 23-25.

Ticonderoga class and Burke class are shield ships. According to the standard of at least 4 shield ships for each aircraft carrier, 44 are needed for 11 aircraft carriers. Each amphibious assault ship needs at least two shield ships, which removes another 18-22. Each dock landing ship needs at least one shield ship, and another 23-25 will be removed. However, the speed of the new frigate is enough to take over the escort task of the existing shield ship.

In this way, 85-92 cruising frigates are needed just for escorting large ships, and the existing patrol frigates are basically occupied. In fact, the United States Navys ship building is also considered around the escort of large ships, and the coincidence between the two is not accidental. However, this also determines that the US Navy has no spare power to form a surface battle group, unless the useless littoral combat ships are carried on top. In terms of combat effectiveness, in addition to running fast, littoral combat ships may not have the upper hand against 056.

The number of allied warships was eased, but the political constraints were aggravated

(function(){( window.slotbydup=window .slotbydup||[]).push({id:u5811557,container:ssp_ 5811557, async:true }Among the allies, only Japan is likely to independently pull up the surface battle group, but it can not compete with Chinas surface battle group with 055 as the core, and the United States may join the allies to form a surface battle group. However, each country has its own large warship escort and even land air defense missions. In fact, few allies have the ability to independently pull up the surface battle group. International politics even affects the combat effectiveness of the mobs mixed surface battle group. Chinas surface battle group with 055 as the core is a strong presence in the Western Pacific and even the oceans beyond. 055 is far more than a Chinese aircraft carriers armed guard. This article is the exclusive contribution of the observer. The content of the article is the authors personal view, which does not represent the platform view. Without authorization, it can not be reproduced, otherwise legal responsibility will be investigated. Pay close attention to guanchacn, the wechat of observer network, and read interesting articles every day. Source: observer.com editor in charge: Yao Wenguang_ NN1682

Among the allies, only Japan is likely to independently pull up the surface battle group, but it can not compete with Chinas surface battle group with 055 as the core

It is possible for the United States to join allies to form a surface battle group. However, each country has its own large warship escort and even land air defense missions. In fact, few allies have the ability to independently pull up the surface battle group. International politics even affects the combat effectiveness of the mobs mixed surface battle group. Chinas surface battle group with 055 as the core is a strong presence in the Western Pacific and even the oceans beyond.

055 is far more than a Chinese aircraft carriers armed guard.

This article is the exclusive contribution of the observer. The content of the article is the authors personal view, which does not represent the platform view. Without authorization, it can not be reproduced, otherwise legal responsibility will be investigated. Pay close attention to guanchacn, the wechat of observer network, and read interesting articles every day.