Unveiling the Sino Indian border conflict 40 years ago: Mao Zedong smashed it with a big hand

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 Unveiling the Sino Indian border conflict 40 years ago: Mao Zedong smashed it with a big hand


He also explained that our commanders and fighters on the Sino Indian border have reached a level of outrage. He then submitted several measures to avoid the border conflict between China and India jointly studied by the general staff and the Ministry of foreign affairs, such as no first shot, no return fire, etc. Mao Zedong listened to the report, his face was solemn and he kept smoking.

According to Mao Zedongs proposal, at the Hangzhou conference, the central government determined the isolation policy to avoid border conflicts.

In January 1960, the Chinese side took a series of extraordinary measures, ordering us not to shoot, patrol, counter insurgency, hunt, target, exercise or explode within 20 km of the line of actual control; warn the invading Indian army to withdraw, and only when the dissuasion fails can they be disarmed in accordance with international practice; after being convinced, they will return their weapons and let them leave u3002

Within two years after the Chinese government unilaterally ordered the army to withdraw by 20 km, the Indian army not only did not shrink at all, but intensified its attack on China. In April 1960, Zhou Enlai flew to New Delhi to hold high-level talks on border issues with Nehru. Nehrus attitude did not change at all, and he once again made territorial claims to China. That is 125000 square kilometers of Chinese territory, which is equivalent to a Fujian Province. How can the Chinese government give up to each other? In 1961, the Chinese government made several peace talks proposals to Nehru and implemented the policy of isolation, which were all rejected one by one. In 1962, the situation became increasingly tense.

In June, the Indian army accelerated its armed invasion of China, crossing the McMahon line in the East and entering the kadong area in the south of Tibet. By the end of August, the Indian army had established more than 100 strongholds in China. The nearest of these strongholds is tens of meters or even a few meters away from the Chinese posts, forming a face-to-face confrontation. Some of them are wedged between the Chinese posts, and some are behind the Chinese border posts. As the Indian army moved closer, it was clear that they would come to make trouble.

Zhou Enlai suggested self-defense and counterattack. Mao Zedong said that no deal could be made

On October 18, 1962, the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened by Mao Zedong was held in the Yinian Hall of Zhongnanhai. This is an extraordinary meeting, which will make important decisions on the border issue between China and India.

Mao Zedong, who presided over the meeting, first asked Qiao Guanhua and Lei Yingfu to report on the situation of the border conflict between China and India and the reactions from various aspects.

After their reports, Zhou Enlai began to speak. He emphatically analyzed the situation concerning the border issue between China and India, and explained that from various aspects, we could not do without self-defense and counterattack. Therefore, he suggested that self-defense counterattack should be carried out immediately. After in-depth analysis and discussion, the meeting unanimously agreed with Zhou Enlai.

Mao Zedong said: over the years, we have taken many measures to seek a peaceful solution to the border issue between China and India. India has refused to do so and deliberately provoked armed conflicts, which have become more and more intense. It is really deceiving. Since Nehru has to fight, we have to be with you. Its not polite to come or go. As the saying goes, no deal can be made if there is no fight. Only if we fight back, can the border be stabilized and a peaceful settlement of the border issue be possible. But our counterattack is only warning and punitive. It just tells Nehru and the Indian government that it is not possible to solve the border problem by military means.

Zhang Guohua advocated that Mount Taishan should be suppressed and Mao Zedong would sweep it with a big hand

After Mao Zedong finished, the meeting then discussed the strength comparison between the two armies and whether they could win.

As for the plan of counterattack, we agree with the plan jointly drawn up by the general staff and commander Zhang Guohua.

According to the suggestions put forward by the general staff, the time for counterattack was set on October 20 (two days after the meeting), and the commander in chief of the front line was Zhang Guohua, commander of the Tibet Military Region.

Before leaving the Yi Nian hall, Chen Yi and he long both learned from Zhang Guohua about the preparations for the border defense in detail.

Zhang Guohua did not say much: we have made adjustments according to the chairmans statement that the frontier defense forces are not more sophisticated than the elite. . If you want to fight, you will be able to get down to the top of the mountain.

Zhang Guohua made a quick mark in his notes and put forward his suggestion: I think we should not only prepare to counterattack the invasion of Indian army, but also prepare to combat the return of rebels who fled to Nepal.

The meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee is in progress. Mao Zedong stood in front of the huge map, one hand holding smoke, the other hand made a cuddle posture, said: we insert, do not hit. He changed his posture, as if to himself: 21 square kilometers, more than 2000 people, it is possible to make a wish, but in fact can not. The cigarette butt lit up several times. He pondered for a long time, pointed to the Indian army stronghold and chopped it with his big hand. At the same time, he raised his voice and said, sweep it!

General secretary Deng Xiaoping added: we must strive for time. He turned to Zhang Guohua and asked, is the food enough?

Zhang Guohua replied: there are still more than 200 million jin of grain produced by the Guangming military region.

Deng Xiaoping was very satisfied: well, this is a strategic vision.

Luo Ruiqing, Secretary General of the Military Commission, asked, are you sure?

Yes, Zhang replied

Although the enemy we are facing is the trump card army of India, it is not comparable to the main force of Chiang Kai Shek. They have not fought for a long time, but we have just rehabilitated the rebels; they have never been to the mountains, but we often live in the mountains...

On October 18, the day Zhang Guohua arrived in Lhasa, the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the military region was held urgently. Wang Kang, chief of staff of the military region, first conveyed the central instructions: the chief of staff thinks that this battle is as significant as the Pingxingguan battle.

Zhang Guohua stood up and conveyed Mao Zedongs instructions. He learned very well, including Mao Zedongs slow chop with his hand. He spoke quickly, asked a series of questions and then whispered a few words. It seems that these are the main words he wants to say: it is of great importance and far-reaching influence. My resolution is: prepare for 1300 casualties. We should not consider casualties at all. No matter 1300 or 2300, we should fight one by one and make up one. We should always keep the four large regiments full. When a general talks about the anticipation of a battle, he always feels extra happy. Even when he gives an order, in order to strengthen command, we can all go down. If necessary, the deputy commander can go to the regiment to strengthen it. He looked around the meeting hall again, and his words were full of encouragement: this is an extraordinary period. Everything should focus on the war, obey the front line, carry out the responsibility that he has undertaken, and be responsible to the end. Now its up to Beijing to see us. Its time for Communist Party members to perform!

Mao believed in front-line commanders: let him fight! Its not good to play again!

Zhang Guohua entered the front command post on the 19th.

When he told the idea to another leader, the other leader was shocked: this is too risky! In case...

Another leader was worried: now that the war is going to be big, is it possible to postpone the launching time of the campaign by two days so that the troops can be fully prepared?

Zhang Guohua did not say: take a look at the preparation of the troops.

The political commissar of the Yin FA Tang Dynasty, on behalf of the two-level leaders of the newly established division and regiment of the 1949 army, once again said, commander Zhang, the time for launching the campaign can not be postponed.

Why? Zhang Guohua kept silent.

More than 10000 of us went into the battlefield and hid in the forest for a day and a night without using fireworks. If we delay for another two days, we would easily expose our intention to fight. Whats the suddenness of another attack then?

The two opinions are reflected in Zhongnanhai. Some leaders also believe that Zhang Guohua is taking risks. Mao Zedong didnt like to stick to the conventions and pushed the manuscript of another opinion to the other side of the table. He was rather sulky: he is the commander of the front line. Let him fight! Its not good to play again!

The plan was set. At the cadres meeting, his agitated voice suppressed the noise before the attack: now, the enemy is not 1300, but 2500. We are ready to attack it by 3000. If we are to reinforce, we will hit it by 5000. In order to solve the problem in three to five days, we should not be afraid of casualties. We should prepare for 2000 casualties. We should fight well, fight fast and make a quick decision. We must annihilate all of them. They are not restricted by the wheat line, but should be reported to the central government. The person in charge of the front is responsible for the bad operation, and the person in charge of logistics is responsible for the poor supply. Who cant do well should be held accountable. If we cant fight well, we should say negatively that we have not completed our tasks; if we say positively, we are not qualified for Party members.

At 7:30 on October 20, just as the fish belly was white in the East, the Chinese peoples Liberation Armys artillery poured out all over the Indian armys position which had invaded kejielong. At 9:30, the first Indian stronghold was captured. By 8 p.m., the battle of kegelang was over. Zhang Guohua shrugged and laughed: its the first time that Ive been in the army for 33 years for such an easy to obtain suddenness.

On the 23rd, the Central Committee sent a telegram praising: under the difficult conditions of the cold plateau, the combat troops were full of fighting spirit, arduous and courageous, and simply wiped out the enemy. The former finger of the military region has just received this encouraging message, but before it can be forwarded, it has also received a notice from the central government to take back the message. Zhang Guohua: whats the matter? By the time he received the second telegram, his doubts remained unresolved. The latter telegram was only two sentences longer than the previous. One is that good news is reported frequently, and the other is the Central Committee and the military commission are extremely happy which is quite emotional. Why did he take back the former telegram? Zhang Guohua estimated that the tone was like two words added by Chairman Mao himself. Mao Zedong was more than happy. He hoped that the telegram would encourage the morale of the front line Yes, it must be!

In a short period of more than one month, Zhang Guohua won two battles and some sporadic battles. Three enemy brigades were annihilated and captured alive, including Wang Pai brigade commander Darwi and another brigadier general Singh. More than 7000 enemy troops were killed and captured, accounting for 80% of the results of the counterattack war in the entire Sino Indian border area. Chinese combat forces also paid a price, with 1460 casualties. What is important is that we have gained operational experience in peacetime. After the war, many battle backbones were transported to other units. In 1963, on the proposal of Mao Zedong, Zhang Guohua also transferred 12 platoon commanders who had participated in the battle for the central security corps.

Mao Zedongs conclusion is that it is easier to shake the mountains than to shake the PLA

No, the chairman calls to hear from you that you have always been on the front line and have the most say.

Zhang Guohua felt uneasy. He knew that the chairman liked to interrupt questions and improvise when listening to the bulletin. He was afraid that some details might be missed and that the answer was not appropriate We have to speed up the preparation of the outline of the report. After the preparation, he did not feel sure, so he sent the outline to Luo Ruiqing, Secretary General of the Military Commission, for review. Secretary General Luo approved a few words on it: Ive seen it. Its very good. Please report to the central working conference according to this.

On the afternoon of February 19, the report meeting was held in Huairen Hall, Zhongnanhai. When he walked to the platform of Huairen Hall, his calm and calm expression suddenly became tense again. It seemed that all the eyes were on him, smiling at him. He looked to the left and then to the right, and his seat was arranged between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. He couldnt remember how he got to his seat. I only remember that when I was too nervous, I abandoned all my thoughts. He told himself: the microphone is not a machine gun. What are you afraid of! Anyway, its something Ive experienced personally, so lets just say it.

When he talked about some troops taking part in the war in Taicang, Mao Zedong cut in as expected: the 55th division, which started from Xining in Qinghai Province and was transported by truck, was mobilized on the road and almost attacked as soon as it arrived. The 130th division is a production force in Sichuan. It puts down the hoe and gets on the train. As soon as it arrives, it makes mobilization work on the automobile road. It is very hasty. Mao Zedong pointed to Zhang Guohua and said, even you, the general, are sent temporarily.

Mao Zedong encouraged Zhang Guohua to continue. When he said that this struggle is a complicated political and military struggle, Mao Zedong happily interjected: we should pay attention to military affairs, only engage in literature, not military, that is dangerous. Comrades of the major regional and provincial Party committees should prepare for war and train their troops for eight months a year. Mao Zedong turned to his side, looked at Zhang Guohua with a smile and half jokingly said, you are also a secretary! As soon as theres a war, youll be well. Mao Zedong kowtowed the ash and added: of course, there is still a disease to be treated.

Zhang Guohua went on to say: the Central Military Commission and the headquarters have given us timely, specific and detailed instructions in every major transition season in the war...

Mao Zedong interposed: I have participated in the war this time. And Shaoqi, Premier and Xiaoping...

Zhang Guohua reported that there were many near battles this time. Mao Zedong said: we should pay attention to the close combat and night war. As for imperialism, I dont believe in close combat or night fighting. You cant win. On the Korean battlefield, Americans are afraid of close combat, night battle, grenades, bayonets, and shooting at tens of meters or 100 meters.

Zhang Guohua: in terms of transportation, we rely on local laws, on ourselves and on the masses. There is no air force support, relying on the ground; there is no road, relying on people and livestock; there is no small, light weight, nutritious dry food, relying on Zanba...

Mao Zedong: in this respect, he is modern, we are primitive. But the primitivism of the revolution has defeated the modernization of the counter revolution.

Finally, Mao Zedong made a strategic evaluation of the Sino Indian border war: we fought a military political war, or a political military war. This battle can maintain the stability of the Sino Indian border for at least 10 years.

History fully proves Mao Zedongs foresight. In fact, for more than 40 years since 1962, the Sino Indian border has maintained a relatively stable situation. The achievement of this situation is closely related to this war: without this war, it is difficult to maintain peace and stability for such a long time.

Before long, Luo Ruiqing reported to Mao Zedong in detail the situation that the troops participating in the war were not afraid of hardship or death. Mao Zedong Thought: