US media: why Indian army has been defeated repeatedly? Information system failure is the key reason

category:Military
 US media: why Indian army has been defeated repeatedly? Information system failure is the key reason


In June this year, a violent conflict broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the kalevan River Valley in the east of Ladakh, where the border is not yet determined. At least 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers have been killed, the first fatal conflict between the two countries since 1975.

New Delhi and Beijing are now easing tensions off and on. Even as the two sides seek to restore a semblance of normality along the border, a key question remains puzzling: why does Indias security agencies seem to be blindfolded by China? Indeed, the fact that local officials in Ladakh have been issuing warnings for years proves that New Delhis intelligence gathering and risk assessment system has collapsed.

This is not the first time. India does not seem to have learned important lessons from past intelligence failures.

American foreign policy published this article to comment on the mistakes of Indian intelligence system

In the late 1950s, after a small-scale conflict between the Chinese and Indian armies, China put forward a claim for sovereignty over a large area of disputed border land. In response, New Delhi implemented a so-called forward policy, sending light infantry units to these areas to maintain Indias control over the disputed areas.

However, without sufficient firepower and logistical support, the policy had disastrous consequences: in October 1962, when the war-torn PLA launched a massive attack, the strategy proved to be unnecessary provocation. Despite their bravery, the Indian army was defeated before the attack. At the height of the war, the northeastern Indian town of tispur had to evacuate local residents in the face of advancing Chinese troops.

At that time, in the ladakkalwan Valley, the Chinese army also easily occupied the Indian army position and controlled the entire valley. After demonstrating its ability to crush Indian forces if necessary, China announced a unilateral cease-fire the month after the outbreak of the conflict and withdrew its troops from most of the Galvan Valley and other areas. But it continues to control much of the aksechin plateau, which is roughly the size of Switzerland.

How can Indian policymakers allow such a serious miscalculation? These failures stem from structural problems in Indias security agencies: at that time, the intelligence bureau, Indias top intelligence agency, was also responsible for the collection, collation and evaluation of intelligence. This is a flawed system, as there is no outside body to conduct a meaningful review of its conclusions in order to identify its intelligence sources and analyze weaknesses in the reasoning process.

To make matters worse, there is no law requiring parliament to exercise oversight over intelligence agencies, which is a common and important link in many countries. At the same time, the intelligence agency is also short of resources, and most of the time it is excluded from Indias decision-making system. As the agency was eager to support a policy aimed at limiting defense spending, it played down the imminent risk of Chinas attack to policymakers, causing them to continue their forward policy and ignore Chinas growing threat. As expected, India found itself unprepared for Chinas attack.

The military defeat in 1962 sounded a heavy alarm for India. New Delhi has embarked on an important military modernization program. As part of the expansion plan, India approved the construction of 10 new mountain combat divisions. And improve its intelligence collection system by setting up a new director general of security, which focuses on collecting foreign intelligence.

With these improvements, India can better respond to new threats. For example, in 1965, when Pakistan tried to send spies into Indian controlled Kashmir, the Indian army was ready for a light response: the military blocked the disputed border areas, which prevented Pakistan from launching the so-called Grand Slam operation to attack India and seize Indian territory later that year. Pakistan has invested a lot of efforts in the implementation of this operation, but it has been unable to break through the line of defense of the Indian army, thus creating an opportunity for the Indian army to fight back across the border in Punjab. The Indian army even once threatened Lahore, the main city of Pakistan. Although the war eventually ended in a standoff between the two armies, the Indian armys performance has been significantly more impressive than in 1962.

But the Indian army has not kept pace with the times. In 1999, when Pakistan crossed the so-called line of actual control and invaded India, the Indian army, which had not yet expanded its armaments on a large scale, was dozing off. On May 3 of the same year, an Indian shepherd informed the local government that he had seen what appeared to be a cross-border invasion. But it is strange that the Indian military and intelligence agencies did not pay attention to this and several other warnings from local people, so that Islamabad has a firm foothold.

Pakistans offensive involved about 2000 soldiers who occupied a 62 mile long and six mile deep piece of Indian territory. It was a massive invasion, and the Indian army had to call in air support to drive the invaders away from their commanding heights. But the air forces involvement has also been delayed: it took the army a long time to pass information to the air force, which in turn slowed the air forces response.

!

After the conflict, India established the Kargil Review Committee to examine the causes of the conflict and Indias response. One of the results of its review was that there was no organizational mechanism responsible for coordination or goal-directed interaction between agencies and intelligence users at all levels, nor was there a mechanism for assigning tasks to agencies and monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to assess the quality of their work.

The review led to the establishment of two new intelligence agencies in India: the Defense Intelligence Agency and the national technical research organization to coordinate the relationship between the agencies.

However, one of the core issues pointed out in the cagill conflict report has not yet been solved: a strict central integration agency is needed to coordinate the processing of intelligence investigation results, adapt to the usually rapid development of crisis situations, and quickly issue intelligence reports to policy makers to draw unified conclusions. (the Joint Intelligence Committee of the United Kingdom and the office of the director of national intelligence of the United States are examples of this central agency.) The lack of such a central institution in India will lead to poor information exchange among agencies, the inability of policy makers to obtain properly processed intelligence (assessed and combined with the specific situation), and the lack of effective coordination among agencies to respond to emerging threats in a timely manner.

500 Indian soldiers and 400 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in the kagir conflict photo: Al Jazeera

A fragmented Indian intelligence system seems to provide a critical window of time for China to deploy troops to the conflict ridakh region from the beginning. In fact, India has a military advantage over China in its border areas, which leaves Beijing with only one way to create a local military advantage: tactical deception. This year, too. Chinese troops began to hold large-scale military exercises near the Indian border in January to distract Indias attention, and then moved their troops to Ladakh. Such a major Chinese military operation deserves extraordinary close monitoring and inter agency evaluation by Indian intelligence agencies.

However, in fact, some agencies did report the suspicious trend of Chinas sending troops to Ladakh region in February and March, but the information obviously did not reach the top decision-makers of India, at least to some extent, did not fully express the urgency of the incident. As a result of this mistake, the Chinese army entered the Ladakh area, cut off the contact between Indian border patrol posts, and blocked the important roads connecting the mountains.

When the Indian army received accurate information about the arrival of Chinese troops, their only realistic response was to send troops from the regional capital Liecheng. With the help of a more effective national intelligence system, the Indian army could have been given enough advance warning to stop Chinese troops when they tried to enter. Now, on the contrary, they have to catch up to prevent China from moving forward, while the Chinese army has the opportunity to consolidate its foothold on the land it occupies.

As with other thorny issues in Indias national security system, these intelligence failures continue because Indian intelligence agencies do not have enough support to carry out the necessary reforms. Every time there is a major intelligence error, there will be a report, such as after the Kargil war or the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. However, the reform proposals put forward in these reports have only been partially implemented. In a political system where the prime minister does not pay attention, there will be no reform. To create a more centralized and strict intelligence system requires the prime ministers office to spend limited time and energy to deal with the bureaucratic interests of different intelligence agencies, but the political gains are negligible.

(function(){( window.slotbydup=window .slotbydup||[]).push({id:u5811557,container:ssp_ 5811557, async:true }The question now is whether New Delhi will admit that it has experienced an intelligence blunder this year, especially given that Narendra modis government has always wanted to create a strong image for itself. Even if India is to conduct an official review to identify the shortcomings of its intelligence system, it is likely to give only the recommendations that have been made in previous reviews: to strengthen parliamentary oversight of intelligence services, to improve their performance through careful inspection; and to set up a director of state information to ensure that all departments provide timely information for political decision makers. However, under Indias prime minister centered political system, both reforms require Prime Minister modis recognition of such loopholes in the intelligence system and the political will to reform them. Given that modis initial reaction to the crisis denied any invasion, and that the focus of the Indian media has now shifted to the worsening epidemic situation, such a reform of Indias intelligence system is unlikely. (translated by Guan Qun from foreign policy of the United States) source: observer.com editor in charge: Han Jiapeng_ NN9841

The question now is whether New Delhi will admit that it has experienced an intelligence blunder this year, especially given that Narendra modis government has always wanted to create a strong image for itself. Even if India is to conduct an official review to identify the shortcomings of its intelligence system, it is likely to give only the recommendations that have been made in previous reviews: to strengthen parliamentary oversight of intelligence services, to improve their performance through careful inspection; and to set up a director of state information to ensure that all departments provide timely information for political decision makers.

However, under Indias prime minister centered political system, both reforms require Prime Minister modis recognition of such loopholes in the intelligence system and the political will to reform them. Given that modis initial reaction to the crisis denied any invasion, and that the focus of the Indian media has now shifted to the worsening epidemic situation, such a reform of Indias intelligence system is unlikely.

(translated by Guanqun from foreign policy of the United States)