What does the United States want to do in the Taiwan Strait? Globegroup: the expression of anxiety

 What does the United States want to do in the Taiwan Strait? Globegroup: the expression of anxiety

First of all, the U.S. government and Congress have basically formed a coordinated and interactive relationship in China policy, including Taiwan related issues. Since 2017, the United States has established a relatively complete policy system in which the relationship with China is viewed from the perspective of strategic competition, and in which Taiwan is a key component. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States until the fall of the Obama administration, Congress has always been a ruthless role in the formulation of U.S. China policy. On issues such as Taiwan, extreme resolutions or bills have been issued on the basis of values, ideology or geopolitical competition. However, the president is generally more pragmatic in dealing with China policy, forming a constraint on congress, and the U.S. contact policy with China for quite a long time It maintains stability and continuity.

However, after the current government came into power, the relative checks and balances between Congress and the president in the past have basically disappeared. The two not only have coordinated the issuance of a round of conflict bills and policies with China, but also have shown a phenomenon of mutual competition to see who is stronger in China. A series of Taiwan related bills passed by the Congress are often signed by the president quickly, which constitutes the overall tough decision-making characteristics of the government will cooperate with China. There is endogenous inertia in this interactive relationship, which will be difficult to change after its establishment. In this regard, the U.S. policy of conflict with China on Taiwan related issues will be more intensive.

Second, although the U.S. government still claims to adhere to the one China policy, in recent years, a number of domestic legislation is reducing the importance of the one China principle. In the past three years, the U.S. will coordinate with the president to issue documents on Taiwan related issues, such as the national defense authorization law of fiscal year 2018, Taiwan Travel Law, Asian re assurance initiative law and Taipei bill, aiming to strengthen official exchanges with Taiwan, support Taiwan to expand its international influence, and continue its arms sales to Taiwan. These policies have deviated from the usual role of the United States in balancing between the mainland and Taiwan, and objectively played a role in supporting Taiwan independence. This is not only a reflection of the United States abandoning the previous contact policy framework with China, but also a demonstration of the trend of strengthening its competition policy with China.

Third, although Taiwan is placed in an important position in the strategic competition with China, and its Taiwan related policies are more conflicting, the United States will not conduct a thorough showdown with China on the Taiwan issue by provoking more intense friction or even military conflict. At present, the U.S. government is full of super hawks who take an extreme stance on China. Many people worry that they will provoke unpredictable extreme events in the Taiwan Strait, which will cause great trouble between China and the United States.

In fact, the recent handling of us Taiwan related issues shows that the US side still tends to achieve the goal of using Taiwan to contain the mainland through political and diplomatic means. For example, in the event that Taiwan seeks to participate in the World Health Assembly in 2020 as an observer, the United States repeatedly gives oral support and encourages other countries to support it through actions, but it never actually submits proposals in support of Taiwan to the World Health Assembly. The U.S. is good at promoting the so-called position principle and making clear the interest boundary of Taiwan related actions. The intention of the United States to use the Taiwan issue to contain and slander the mainland is clear, but it will never harm its own major interests because of Taiwan.

In the game of big powers, the competition is often about their strategic patience and their confidence in their social vitality. In recent years, the U.S. extreme policy related to Taiwan is not only a manifestation of its anxious psychology and lack of social vitality. We believe that the dominant power in the settlement of the Taiwan issue lies on the mainland side, which has been the case in the past and will remain the case in the future. (the author is a professor of the Institute of international relations, School of Foreign Affairs)

(function(){( window.slotbydup=window .slotbydup||[]).push({id:u5811557,container:ssp_ 5811557, async:true }Global Times: the United States and Taiwan will feel pain if they want to make small moves in mainland China CCTV: the decision of the world health assembly is the attitude of the international community towards Taiwan independence source: Global Times Author: Li Haidong editor in charge: Wang MuQing_ NB12712