A few days ago, several criminal judgments published by the judicial document network exposed the details of a fraud case involving up to 3 billion yuan. Among them, Wei and Chen, as the behind the scenes operators, organized 13 fraud gangs, combined insiders, forged fake contracts and radish seals through layers of nested relations, and set up elaborate fraud schemes to obtain bank agreement deposits.
China Merchants Banks 2 billion deposit insurance was cheated
On September 21, 2015, Zhou Yiyi, an employee of China Merchants Bank Shanghai Branch, received a phone call. The caller claimed to be Zhu Yiwu, an employee of Bank of China branch, and lied that the bank intends to accept an agreement deposit business with a term of one year, an amount of 2 billion yuan and an annual interest rate of 4.2%.
After verifying the identity of Zhus bank employees, Zhou took it for granted and quickly entered the process. He told Zhu the contact information of Zhous employee of the third-party channel company Minsheng Tonghui Asset Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Minsheng Tonghui), and then Zhu Shunli got the account opening and seal and other information of Minsheng Tonghui, the channel company.
It is reported that the banks that actually deposit in the agreement deposit business do not open accounts as the bank, but open accounts in the name of other companies to deposit, and the companies that open accounts are called channel companies.
Later, Hu submitted the basic information of the channel company to the mysterious person Wei after many times. Wei quickly forged the account opening information and seal of Minsheng Tonghui. A few days later, Wei and Hu instructed their associates to pretend to be Minsheng Tonghui employees and use forged materials to open accounts with Bank of China, which was actually controlled by Wei.
On October 10, 2015, two employees of China Merchants Shanghai branch and Minsheng Tonghui came to Bank of China, and two other members of the fraud Gang cooperated with Liu Mou, the internal ghost, to act together, pretended to be bank employees and signed the so-called 2 billion agreement deposit agreement with Shanghai Branch of China Merchants Bank, and stamped the fake seal.
Three days later, China Merchants Bank Shanghai Branch remitted 2 billion yuan to Minsheng Tonghuis fake account in Jingzhou, Bank of China, and Liu gave the forged certificate of deposit of 2 billion yuan to employees of China Merchants Bank Shanghai Branch.
Set up a bureau and set up two other banks
Guangfas 500 million fund was cheated
However, it didnt end with the success of CMB.
Wei and Hu found that this kind of scheme with the help of inter-bank deposit agreement could cheat the employees of big banks. Although 2 billion yuan was not cheated into their pockets, these 13 member fraud gangs began to target the other two joint-stock banks.
Therefore, following the example of a gourd, the group used similar crimes to defraud the Fuzhou branch of China Development Bank and Jinan Branch of China CITIC Bank. Among them, the 500 million capital of Fuzhou branch of China Guangfa bank was set up by Chen Mou, who was contacted by Wei Mou, as the behind the scenes operator.
On November 10, 2015, Hu once again pretended to be an employee of Jingzhou branch of Agricultural Bank of China, contacted Wu, an employee of Fuzhou branch of China Guangfa bank, and released the temptation of agreement deposit business.
Wu didnt doubt its authenticity. After getting the approval of the superior, he handed the contact information of Su, an employee of the life insurance asset management company of the channel company, to Hu. Then Hu successfully got the basic information of the channel company and passed it to Chen through the nesting relationship. Chen forged the information and seal, and successfully opened a fake account in Jingzhou branch of ABC.
After signing the false agreement deposit contract between Jingzhou branch of Agricultural Bank of China and life insurance company, the 500 million yuan fund of Fuzhou branch of China Guangfa bank was transferred into the fake account actually controlled by Chen.
In the end, the 500 million yuan came and was divided up. After some of the funds were divided into accounts, others turned to the company accounts controlled by Chen and purchased land and funds.
However, China CITIC Bank Jinan Branchs 500 million funds did not succeed in fraud. The main reason is that when swindling Jinan Branch of China CITIC Bank, these people did not succeed in passing through the banks business department as the front door. Because the place where the agreement was signed caused the suspicion of the staff of China CITIC Bank, the signing of the agreement was temporarily cancelled. Therefore, the crime of swindling Jinan Branch of China CITIC Bank of 500 million failed.
Internal and external collusion of bank employees
Judging from the judgment issued by the judicial documents, these three cases involved in fraud with a total amount of up to 3 billion yuan are similar in practice, but the way of committing the crime is extremely complex, in which the relationship is nested layer by layer, making it difficult to distinguish the true and the false.
According to the details disclosed in the judgment, the fraud Gang should first find the false capital demander, obtain the information of the capital bank first, then contact the capital bank through the fake bank staff, forge a series of agreement deposit contracts and bank seals, borrow the bank office through the cooperation of many people, and sign agreements with the capital bank and the channel company, so as to carry out the fraud.
In the specific implementation process, the division of labor of these people is very clear. Take the successful fraud case of Fuzhou branch of China Guangfa bank as an example, it is divided into six levels:
The first level is Chen, who operates according to Weis instructions, specifically dealing with false materials.
The second level is in accordance with the instructions of Chen.
The third level is Yang, who is responsible for preparing bank related materials, documents, engraving seals, providing the identity of bank staff to me and the custodian bank for docking, opening bank accounts, signing deposit agreements, transferring funds, and claiming intermediary benefits.
The fourth level is Hu, who pretends to be a bank employee looking for a bank that needs a large amount of funds after using the funds to make an agreement deposit.
The fifth level is Ren, who is responsible for the source of funds, the name of the trusteeship bank, the name, position, contact information of the management personnel of the trusteeship bank, the nominal interest of the negotiated deposit and other information, the docking with the trusteeship bank, the risk control, the signing of the deposit agreement, etc.
The sixth level is that Li and Liu, who are bank staff, should cooperate with the higher level, provide bank information, pretend to be bank president to sign an agreement, open bank accounts and ask for intermediary fees.
In the statement of the case, Hu said, the superior of each level is the fund side of the subordinate, while everyone is the intermediary introducer, and each level of introducer should collect the benefit fee from it.
From the perspective of account distribution, we can see that the division of labor of this group is clear. After defrauding 500 million yuan, Chen directly swallowed 37.25 million yuan, Wei shared 16.9 million yuan, Yang shared 12.5 million yuan, Ren shared 7.5 million yuan, Hu shared 9 million yuan, Yin shared 7.5 million yuan, and others shared the remaining money.
It is worth noting that in the whole process of fraud, everyones identity is false, only two people are true, that is, as bank staff, Li and Liu.
It is because these two people play the role of internal ghost that they provide the fraud gang with the details of bank account opening process and internal staff information, sign agreements as the bank president, provide the bank office as a performance venue, open accounts in violation of rules and regulations, and ask for intermediary fees. As a result, China Mobile bank step by step stepped into the fraud carefully designed by the fraud gang.
Temptations of high deposit step on the trap
In the second round, although the three cases of fraud were carefully set up and cleverly arranged, the business model was not complicated, that is, the interbank deposit agreement.
The three banks have been set in succession, mainly because they are familiar with the business model of the banks, and use the psychology of bank staff to pull deposits for performance, so that the banks lack the process of repeated review of the authenticity of these huge deposit agreements.
Take Shanghai Branch of China Merchants Bank as an example. After receiving Hus phone call, the employees of the bank heard that the annual interest rate was as high as 4.2% and they were soon recruited. It was mainly the temptation of high interest of huge deposits that made the employee ignore the authenticity of the audit and report the process quickly.
According to the analysis of people familiar with the interbank model, at present, the quotation of Shanghai interbank offered rate is basically based on 3.1% interest rate, 4.2% interest rate is 1.1% higher than the market average quotation, and 2 billion deposits means that 22 million more can be earned.
According to the information disclosed in the judgment, as early as 2012, only Wei, a junior high school culture, knew sun, a money broker. Later, I got to know other members of the group, some of whom are middlemen who are familiar with the interbank model and do financing. These fund brokers often open the channels between enterprises and banks by introducing the upstream and downstream of funds, and earn commissions, while avoiding many risk control means of banks.
According to the intermediate peoples Court of Jingzhou City, the above-mentioned persons, for the purpose of illegal possession, make up the facts, conceal the truth and defraud the funds of the injured bank, with a huge amount, all of their acts constitute the crime of fraud. Wei, Chen, Li and Hu were sentenced to life imprisonment, deprivation of political rights for life and confiscation of all personal property.
After the shocking fraud case was exposed, the industry was shocked. On the one hand, the inner ghost helps the criminals to complete the fraud by means of fake contracts and radish chapters, opening fake accounts and lending bank offices by taking advantage of his position. It is hard to detect that there is no leakage in the links.
More netizens exclaimed: the original bank is also a vulnerable group, fortresses are broken from within.