Mens online futures speculation was deceived by nearly 500,000 Guomei platforms involved

category:Society
 Mens online futures speculation was deceived by nearly 500,000 Guomei platforms involved


Sino-Singapore Jingwei Client on April 10, because of accidental opportunity to know the so-called stock speculation master, and under its recommendation opened an account in a so-called online futures trading platform, Mr. Wang from Anhui lost nearly 500,000 yuan in a few days.

Before I recovered, the money was gone, and then I realized that the so-called futures trading platform was cloned and someone was operating behind the scenes. Mr. Wang said.

In July 2018, Mr. Wang reported the case to Putuo Branch of Shanghai Public Security Bureau, which has also been filed by the public security organs. However, due to the complexity of the case and the high cost of handling the case, there has not been much substantive progress so far. When Mr. Wangs money will be recovered is still unknown.

DATA FIGURE: The police uncovered the scene of the fraud on the false futures trading platform. Photo Source: Zhongxin.com

Zero threshold speculation futures fraud

Mr. Wang recalled to Sino-Singapore Jingwei clients that at first he met a stock speculator nicknamed Dasheng in Weixin. After gradually building trust, Mr. Wang opened accounts on a platform called Blackstone Investment Trading System and another platform called Bosch Financial Platform under his guidance.

There are investment thresholds on formal futures trading platforms, and there are no thresholds for speculation on these websites. Mr. Wang said that the reason why he initially agreed to open an account was that he had no trading threshold. On the other hand, he was also impulsive and was confused by the aforementioned stock speculators.

The assistant of the stock speculation master instructs Mr. Wang on Wechat. Mr. Wangs contribution to the picture

Within a few days, Mr. Wang has successively transferred funds to the above platforms through third-party channels according to the instructions of the Master of Stock Exchange, but almost every investment has lost money. It was not until 480,000 yuan was lost that Mr. Wang realized that he should have been fooled.

Mr. Wang then went to the bank to check the flow of water and found that his money had not been transferred to the so-called Blackstone investment or Bosch Finance, but to two companies unrelated to the above platform - Guangzhou Lianfeng Network Technology Co., Ltd. and Guangxi Yuxiaojie Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd.

Enterprise survey information shows that the registered capital of Guangzhou Lianfeng Network Technology Co., Ltd. is 1 million yuan, and the actual control is Chen Xunwu; the registered capital of Guangxi Yuxiaojie Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd. is 3 million yuan, and the actual control is Deng Yan Factory.

At present, the Bosch Financial Official Network provided by Mr. Wang has been unable to open, and the so-called Hong Kong customer service telephone can not be reached, only the no business number prompt.

Sino-Singapore Jingwei Client noticed that Mr. Wangs experience was not an example. In Baidu Post Bar and Sina Blog, users claim that they have been defrauded by Bosch Finance, and the story of being defrauded is basically the same as Mr. Wangs experience.

Foreign exchange dealers and agents inquiry platform, Foreign Exchange Day Eye, wrote after field research that the so-called Australian company address of Bosch Finance was actually a grocery store, and this kind of false propaganda did not know how many Chinese investors had been deceived. At the same time, it reminds investors that the regulatory information of Bosch Financial Australia is false, which proves that the platform is fraudulent in the domestic exhibition industry, and suggests that investors stay away as soon as possible to avoid unnecessary property losses.

Gomes Third Party Payment Platform is involved

According to Mr. Wang, six of the funds cheated were transferred to Beijing Yinying Tong Payment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Yinying Tong) through China UnionPay Shanghai Branch and then transferred from Yinying Tong to Guangzhou UnionPay Network Technology Co., Ltd. through its bank flow and verification with the customer service staff of ICBC and China UnionPay Shanghai Branch. The amount is about 410,000 yuan, with the remainder. Nearly 70,000 yuan has flowed into Guangxi Yuxiaojie Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd. through Xunfu Information Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Xunfu).

In addition, Mr. Wang has nearly 70,000 yuan of funds through the Fast Payment Liquidation Information Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Fast Payment) in the false futures trading platform for cash in and cash out operations. Cash out refers to the transfer of funds from futures accounts to banks by investors, while Cash in refers to the transfer of funds from bank accounts to futures accounts.

Chat screenshots provided by Mr. Wang show that customer service personnel in the area of fast money payment said that at present, fast money payment has terminated cooperation with suspected fraudulent businesses in the case, and suggested that Mr. Wang contact the bank to apply for refusal of payment or filing a case.

Chat screenshot provided by Mr. Wang

According to the public information, YinYing Ying Tong Payment Co., Ltd. was registered and established in Beijing in April 2005. It is one of the earliest institutions engaged in third-party payment business in China. The registered capital of the company is RMB 100 million. It is a professional third-party payment/cross-border payment institution and Internet finance/e-commerce system service provider. It obtained the Payment Business License issued by the Peoples Bank of China in January 2013.

According to media reports, on March 20, 2017, Gome has completed the acquisition of 70% of the shares of Yinying Tong, with a transaction price of about 500 million yuan. On the evening of June 7, 2017, Gome Financial Technology, a company owned by Gome Holdings Group, issued the Continuous Related Transactions on Loans and Related Transactions of Target Companies for the Purchase of VIE Contracts, announcing that Ying Ying Tong Payment Co., Ltd. was embraced, and Gome finally obtained the Internet Payment License.

The company was awarded the first Payment Business License by the Peoples Bank of China in 2011, according to the official website of Xunfei Information Technology Co., Ltd. At present, the company can support online payment of international mainstream credit cards and all domestic mainstream banks, providing financial-grade payment experience for more than 600,000 businesses and 20 million users worldwide.

According to the official website of Fast Money Company, since its establishment in 2004, Fast Money has covered more than 430 million individual users and more than 5 million business partners, and has docked more than 100 financial institutions. Headquartered in Shanghai, the company has more than 40 branches in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and other places, and has set up a financial services R&D center in Nanjing. In 2014, Fast Money and Wanda Group reached strategic holding cooperation to jointly build an Internet financial platform based on the real industry. At the end of 2014, Wanda acquired 68.7% of Fast Money for $315 million. There had been news that Wanda wanted to sell fast money to pay, but Wanda did not comment.

At present, Mr. Wang has submitted a complaint letter to the regulatory authorities, hoping that the regulatory authorities will punish the third-party payment channels and order the third-party payment institutions to help victims recover legitimate economic losses.

So, in this process, whether third-party payment institutions need to take responsibility? Industry insiders pointed out to Sino-Singapore Jingwei clients that third-party payment as a payment channel, unless they know that these accounts are fraudulent accounts, or their own account compliance review errors, they should bear the corresponding responsibility, otherwise it is difficult to bear responsibility.

Huang Dazhi, a researcher at Suning Institute of Finance, told Sino-Singapore Jingwei clients that, generally speaking, third-party payment institutions do not bear the main responsibility. In the process of consumersconsumption or investment, the third-party payment institutions provide payment services, which transfer funds according to the instructions of their contracting merchants and charge a certain fee, rather than the final collector of funds. Payment institutions need not bear liability for compensation when they operate in accordance with the states requirements for payment safety management. However, according to the relevant provisions of the E-Commerce Law of the Peoples Republic of China, Payment institutions are liable for user losses caused by the following circumstances: irregular electronic payment services provided, wrong payment instructions caused by their own reasons, unauthorized payment caused by non-user faults, discovery of unauthorized payment and failure to stop loss in time, etc.

For investors or consumers, only the flow of funds can be found within the scope of their power, which naturally attributes the responsibility to third-party payment institutions. In this regard, Payment institutions should adhere to the concept of good payment with empathy for users, actively cooperate with users and the police to recover the flow of illegal funds to help users recover losses. At the same time, we should strengthen the auditing of merchants and establish a reasonable risk prevention and control system. Consumers and investors should also be alert to investment platforms that promise high interest rates and high incomes so as to avoid being cheated. Huang Dazhi said.

Du Yunfeng, senior partner lawyer of Beijing Haizhengcheng Law Firm, pointed out in an interview with clients of Zhongxin Jingwei that the responsibility of third-party channels should be differentiated. If there is a normal transaction relationship between third-party channels and suspected fraudulent platforms, third-party platforms are unaware of the fraudulent acts of suspected fraudulent platforms and can be active during the period of investigation by public security organs. If the third party channel knows nothing at first and intentionally shelters the crime after the investigation is filed by the public security organ, it should bear the corresponding criminal responsibility; if the third party channel knows from the beginning and actively provides the channel, it should be suspected of fraud (accomplice).

Source of this article: Sino-New Zealand Editor Responsible for Longitudinal and Latitude: Pan Qingqing_NBJS5830